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Abstract
Uncertain outcomes are an inevitable feature of policy choices and their public support often
depends on their perceived justice. We theoretically and experimentally explore just alloca-
tions when recipients are exposed to certainty and uncertainty. In the experiment, uninvolved
participants unequivocally choose to allocate resources equally between recipients, when there
is certainty. In stark contrast, with uncertainty just allocations are widely dispersed and re-
cipients exposed to higher degrees of uncertainty are allocated less. The observed allocations
can be well organized by four different theoretical views of justice, indicating that uninvolved
participants differ fundamentally in their views on justice under uncertainty.
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1 Introduction
The perceived justice of policy choices is often of paramount importance for the public and po-
litical acceptance of the planned or implemented policy. This is exemplified by the vivid public
debate surrounding reforms of pension, social security or health care systems (e.g., Krugman
2009) and the political upheavals in countries undergoing tight reforms of their tax and gov-
ernmental financing system (e.g., The Economist 2013). Importantly, due to uncertainty, the
ultimate outcome of almost any policy choice is often unknown ex ante. Hence, the importance
to understand how people perceive justice under uncertainty.1
People may differ in what they perceive as just under uncertainty. For instance, should one
deliver a well tested safe vaccine or a new vaccine that with some probability will save more
lives but may also induce strong adverse reactions (cf. Adler and Sanchirico 2006, p.282)? A
similar question is prominently present in the debate on organ allocation criteria. The ‘maximum
benefit criterion’ proposes to rank potential receivers of an organ according to their probability
of survival after the transplant, whereas opponents argue that information on patients’ mortality
risk should not affect the ranking (Childress 2001). Similarly, one may ask what constitutes a just
compensation scheme for civil servants occupying risky jobs (e.g., firefighters, police) relative to
other safer occupations. Or, what the just allocation of resources is between researchers proposing
projects with relatively certain outcomes and researchers proposing projects with high benefit
when lucky but low benefit when unlucky.
In this paper we theoretically and experimentally investigate the fundamental question un-
derlying these problems. What constitutes a just allocation of resources when recipients of these
resources are exposed to uncertainty? Specifically, we are interested whether otherwise similar
people differ in their views on justice when the outcome of an allocation is uncertain.
That uncertainty introduces the potential of disagreement into justice considerations can
be most cleanly exemplified when considering equally deserving recipients. Under certainty
1In the economic literature the terms justice and fairness are often treated synonymous. However, in moral
philosophy and social choice theory these terms can conceptually differ. For instance, Pareto efficiency can be
viewed as a principle (or axiom) of justice but its distributive consequences can be perceived as unfair. Similar
arguments can be made for desert-based principles of justice (see, e.g., Varian 1975, Lamont and Favor 2014).
The term fairness is also often invoked when referring to other-regarding behavior and/or preferences (e.g., Rabin
1993, Fehr and Schmidt 1999). To avoid confusion, in this paper we use the term justice when referring to views
and decisions of uninvolved agents who have no stakes in the decision situation and to the term fairness when
referring to views and decisions of involved agents.
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it seems natural that any just allocation would comprise an equal distribution of resources.
However, when at least one of the recipients is faced with uncertainty prominent justice ideas
may imply diverging just allocations.2 A utilitarian approach would allocate resources such
that the sum of expected utilities is maximized but would be indifferent to the possibility of
resulting inequalities. Alternatively, principles of equality can be applied ex ante or ex post.
In the ex ante view, focusing on initial symmetry of recipients, a just allocation would either
equalize expected outcomes or expected utilities, depending on whether or not risk preferences
of recipients are taken into account in the evaluation. In the ex post view, the distribution of
final outcomes determines how just the allocation is. It is clear that, in general, the application
of these different principles will lead to different just allocations.
We report results of the first experiment exploring individuals’ distributive justice views when
a recipient is exposed to various degrees of uncertainty. The experiment consists of a production
phase followed by an allocation phase. In the production phase, two participants engage in a
real effort task and produce a joint monetary surplus. The effort task is calibrated such that
both participants are equally deserving. In the allocation phase, a third (otherwise uninvolved)
person, henceforth called spectator (Konow 2009), is asked to distribute the produced surplus
between the other two participants, henceforth called recipients.3
The spectator has to make decisions in several allocation problems, characterized by different
degrees of uncertainty. One recipient always earns exactly what is allocated to him, whereas the
other recipient’s earnings are almost always uncertain. Specifically, for the latter final earnings
can be larger or smaller than the allocation, but are in expectation equal to the allocation in all
problems. To assess the role of risk preferences, we also elicit participants’ own risk preferences
as well as their beliefs about the risk preferences of recipients.
This design allows us to explore the pure effect of uncertainty on just allocations in a clean
way. When there is no uncertainty for both recipients, we expect all spectators to choose the
2The extensive normative theoretical literature on how to assess social situations involving risk differ from the
problem we consider. Nevertheless, the justice concepts discussed in this literature, utilitarianism (e.g., Harsanyi
1955), ex ante egalitarianism (e.g., Diamond 1967, Larry G. Epstein 1992), and ex post egalitarianism (e.g.,
Adler and Sanchirico 2006), provide important guidance in how to think about just allocations under uncertainty
(see also Ben-Porath et al. 1997, Gajdos and Maurin 2004, Fleurbaey 2010).
3Importantly, this third-party impartiality procedure is not equivalent to the Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’ (Rawls
1971), because spectators’ earnings in the experiment are completely unrelated to their allocation decisions. We
deliberately did not choose a ‘behind the veil of ignorance’ approach because it has been shown that the type of
uncertainty entailed by the veil of ignorance influences individuals’ allocation behavior by introducing insurance
purposes (Aguiar et al. 2010, Schildberg-Ho¨risch 2010) and strategic considerations (Gerber et al. 2014).
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equal split. However, will this also be the case when a recipient is exposed to uncertainty? If not,
several additional questions arise. Do just allocations respond to the riskiness of the problem?
Are allocations under uncertainty guided by principles of justice like utilitarianism, ex post or
ex ante egalitarianism? Do differences in allocations reflect substantial disagreement regarding
ideas of justice under uncertainty?
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, in the absence of uncertainty almost
all spectators allocate resources equally between recipients, as expected. We take this as evidence
that (i) our procedure indeed elicits just allocations and (ii) equal treatments of equals is the
prevalent justice view under certainty. Second, just allocations exhibit substantial heterogeneity
in allocation problems characterized by uncertainty. Hence, people who implicitly agree on just
allocations in certain environments, may hold conflicting justice views under uncertainty. Third,
spectators tend to allocated less to the recipient facing uncertainty the higher the degree of
uncertainty. Finally, we show that justice views derived from utilitarianism and egalitarianism
can organize the observed just allocations. We find that a majority of spectators make choices
consistent with some form of ex ante equality but that utilitarian and ex post egalitarian views
also find considerable support. This plurality of justice views under uncertainty is consistent with
a similar finding in a context with productivity differences between recipients (Cappelen et al.
2007). Importantly, the observed disagreement on justice under uncertainty emerges although
our participants have very similar socio-economic backgrounds.
Our paper builds on the tradition of empirical investigations of justice views initiated by
the seminal papers of Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) and Kahneman et al. (1986). These early
studies were employing surveys and vignettes, and have initiated a literature that greatly im-
proved our knowledge about peoples’ justice views (see, e.g., Schokkaert and Overlaet 1989,
Schokkaert and Capeau 1991, Ga¨chter and Riedl 2006, Faravelli 2007, Konow 2009; see also
Konow 2003, Tausch et al. 2013, for overviews).
Konow (2000) was the first to use incentivized experiments in justice research. He introduced
a non-involved subject, the spectator, who was asked to allocate to two anonymous recipients the
joint product of their work (see also Dickinson and Tiefenthaler 2002). Cappelen et al. (2007)
also explore individuals’ justice ideas in situations involving production, but use allocation data
from a standard dictator game. Taken together, the main findings of these studies are that
individuals are held responsible for their outcomes whenever they can reasonably influence them
and that asymmetries between recipients lead to a plurality of justice ideas.
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Cappelen et al. (2013) investigate the allocations of both non-involved subjects and stake-
holders in situations where inequalities in output are the result of antecedent choices under risk.
Similar to us, these authors allow for uncertainty but their study differs in important aspects
from ours. Cappelen et al. (2013) look for allocation decisions after uncertainty is resolved and,
hence, the consequences of any redistribution decision are known. In contrast, we study just
allocations before uncertainty is resolved. Moreover, we study situations where recipients are
equally deserving, whereas the cited study looks at issues of merit.
Two interesting recent studies which also allow for risk in allocation decisions are
Rohde and Rohde (2011) and Brock et al. (2013). Both papers study decisions of involved deci-
sion makers who may or may not exhibit other-regarding preferences. The first study finds that
even though people show concerns for inequality in a risk-free setting they do not respond to the
risk exposure of other subjects. The latter paper explores ex ante and ex post fairness under
uncertainty and finds that, both, expected value comparisons and ex post considerations matter
to explain dictators’ giving in risky situations. These results resonate well with our finding on the
heterogeneity of justice views, as we find that spectators’ choices also reflect concerns for both
ex ante and ex post equality. Hence, taken together Brock et al. (2013) and our study strongly
indicate that under uncertainty involved as well as uninvolved agents exhibit heterogeneity in
respectively fairness and justice views and that both ex ante and ex post considerations are
important.
In spite these important similarities, our contribution is clearly distinct from these papers.
First, these studies explore fairness considerations of stake holders, whereas we study the unbiased
justice views of uninvolved spectators. Second, neither of the previous studies relate observed
behavior to theoretical justice views (as opposed to theoretical models of fairness and inequality
aversion). Moreover, our investigation of the heterogeneity of justice views under uncertainty
is not only interesting for justice research. It can also help interpreting the behavior of stake
holders who trade off own earnings with deviations from their favorite justice view, as studied
in Cappelen et al. (2007) for certain outcomes. Several decision making models assume that
individuals have a preference to implement just allocations derived from normative justice views
(see, for instance, Karni and Safra (2002) and Konow (2000)). Eliciting spectator’s unbiased
justice views is a necessary first step to assess the validity of these approaches.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the studied allocation
problems and provide a theoretical framework for discussing justice under uncertainty. Section 3
4
describes the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 reports the empirical results and
Section 5 concludes.
2 General Set-Up and Theoretical Framework
General set-up. In order to study justice under outcome uncertainty we explore allocation
problems with varying degrees of uncertainty, denoted by m ∈ {1, ..M}. In each allocation prob-
lem, an uninvolved third party, the spectator, has to divide between two recipients a monetary
surplus X jointly produced by them. Importantly, the spectator has no stakes in the produced
surplus. A crucial assumption here is that the spectator’s choices indeed reflect just allocations.
We discuss this issue in more detail in the design section (cf. Section 3).
To isolate the effect of uncertainty, the production task is calibrated such that equal produc-
tivity of recipients in the production of X is (almost certainly) guaranteed. Moreover, anonymity
of the spectator as well as both recipients is ensured. Consequently, the spectator does not have
any information about recipients’ characteristics that would allow her to discriminate between
recipients, implying that they should be viewed as equally deserving. Indeed, under anonymity
(symmetry) basically all theoretical rules of justice imply equality (see, e.g., Young 1995).
Recipients only differ in that one of them, for convenience called U , is exposed to uncertainty
whereas the other, for convenience called C, faces certainty. Importantly, whether a recipient is
exposed to uncertainty or not is beyond her influence. Specifically, in each allocation problem
m the uninvolved third party has to divide the amount X between recipients U and C, with
X = xU +xC . Recipient U ’s final outcome depends on which of two possible events realizes after
the allocation of xU . The ‘good’ event H realizes with probability p in which case the amount
xU allocated to U is multiplied by k
H > 1. With probability 1−p the ‘bad’ event l realizes, with
the consequence that xU is multiplied by k
l (1 > kl ≥ 0).
Next to the effect of uncertainty per se we are also interested in how different degrees of
uncertainty affect just allocations. Therefore, the investigated allocation problems differ in the
likelihoods (p, 1− p) of the good and bad events as well as in the consequences (kH , kl) coupled
with these events. In order to meaningfully compare allocations across different problems we
have to ensure that they are not confounded by other motives. We achieve this by choosing kH ,
kl, and p such that in each allocation problem m it holds that
p xU k
H + (1− p) xU k
l = xU . (1)
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Hence, in each allocation problem, U receives in expectation exactly what is allocated to her.
This property ensures specifically that motivations related to risk exposure cannot be confounded
with expected material efficiency concerns.4
The allocation problems are chosen such that for any constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
or constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function for money, the expected utility of a
given allocation xU to a risk averse recipient U in problem m is larger than the expected utility
in problem m+ 1. Accordingly, we will call allocation problem m+ 1 riskier than problem m.5
This variation in riskiness allows us to study if and how just allocations are influenced by the
dispersion of final outcomes.6
Theoretical framework. Scholars of distributive justice research invoked uncertainty as a
means to discuss and rationalize justice principles (Rawls 1971, Konow 2003) and there is a long
theoretical tradition discussing normative questions of how to assess social situations involving
risk (see Footnote 2). The concepts proposed in this literature cannot be transferred one-to-one
to our allocation problems but we will use them as guidance for the theoretical ideas regarding
just allocations under uncertainty, developed below. We first derive just allocations based on
three variations of the principle of ‘equal treatment of equals’ and then consider justice from a
utilitarian perspective, which takes efficiency considerations into account.
The principle of equal treatment of equals is relevant for the problems we study for two
reasons. First, recipients cannot be discriminated on the basis of any characteristic other than
their exposure to uncertainty. Second, as exposure to uncertainty is exogenous and randomly
assigned, recipients should not be held responsible for their position. However, equal treatment of
equals cannot straightforwardly be implemented because the presence of uncertainty impedes full
equality in ex post outcomes (i.e., after uncertainty is resolved). Therefore, the implementation
of the equal treatment of equals principle is open to different interpretations. We propose three
4For the importance of material efficiency concerns in resource allocations, see Engelmann and Strobel (2004).
We do no want to imply that expected material efficiency may not be interesting when investigating justice under
uncertainty. However, as this is the first experimental study on justice under uncertainty, we chose a set-up that
minimizes the potential influences of other motives.
5Details about parameter values chosen in the experiment are presented in Section 3. The theoretical results
derived below do not dependent on these specific parameter values.
6We also investigated two allocation problems characterized by ambiguity. For brevity we do not discuss them
in the main text but present their characteristics and the corresponding results in Appendix F.
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natural concepts that could be applied: equality in expected outcomes, equality in expected
utilities, and equality in realized outcomes.
First, equality in expected outcomes can be defended as a principle of justice under uncer-
tainty on the basis of equity considerations and the more recent idea of accountability (Konow
1996, 2003). Since in each allocation problem the expected value of an allocation is the allocation
itself (cf. Equation (1)) equality in expected outcomes implies splitting X equally between the
two recipients, in all allocation problems. That is,
xU = xC =
1
2
X. (2)
This approach guarantees that U and C enjoy the same outcome in expected value. Therefore,
we call it EV-equality.
Second, the justice idea of equality in expected utilities is related to Sen’s (1997) Weak Equity
Axiom which states that those in a disadvantaged position should be compensated as well as
Rawls’s (1971) Difference Principle.7 As most individuals are risk averse (Dohmen et al. 2011),
recipients exposed to uncertainty can be considered to be disadvantaged and, hence, should be
compensated by allocating them ex-ante more resources than individuals facing certainty.
Formally, allocations xU and xC , satisfying equality of expected utilities W (x),
8 have to solve
E[W (xU )] = E[W (xC)] s.t. xU + xC = X.
In order to make quantitative statements we assume that recipients can be characterized by a
CRRA utility function for money W (x) = xα that reflects their risk preferences. We make the
CRRA assumption for convenience and because it is most common in the empirical literature
on individuals’ risk preferences (see, e.g., Holt and Laury 2002, Andersen et al. 2008, Wakker
2008, Dohmen et al. 2011).9 Together with the definition of our allocation problems the above
condition can be rewritten as
p (xU k
H)α + (1− p) (xU k
l)α = (xC)
α.
7In his Difference Principle John Rawls argues “(...) that social and economic inequalities (...) are just only if
they result in compensating benefits (...) for the least advantaged members of society. (Rawls 1971, pp. 14–15) In
our experiment, under risk aversion, recipient U is in the least advantaged and thus deserves to be compensated.
8From the spectator’s viewpoint recipients do not differ in any other aspect than their exposure to uncertainty.
It is therefore natural to assume that they are characterized by the same utility function.
9In the empirical results section we analyze our data also under the assumption of CARA and show that our
results do not change substantially.
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Solving this equation with respect to xU and xC gives the just allocations
xU =
1
exp(Zα−1) + 1
X, xC =
exp(Zα−1)
exp(Zα−1) + 1
X, (3)
where Z = ln[p(kH)α + (1 − p)(kl)α]. This allocation of X guarantees that U and C enjoy the
same expected utility and we call the corresponding justice idea EU-equality.10
From Equation (1) it follows that for all α ∈ ]0, 1[, Z < 0 and, hence, exp(Zα−1) < 1. Thus,
for risk-averse recipients, the allocations in (3) imply that in all allocation problems characterized
by uncertainty, recipient U should be allocated more than recipient C. Further, the just allocation
to U increases with the riskiness of the allocation problem, which follows from the fact that Z is
decreasing in the problems’ riskiness. The allocations in (3) are also just according to EU-equality
when we assume that risk is positively valued (i.e., α > 1). In that case, U should be allocated
less than C and the allocation to U decreases with the riskiness of the allocation problem.
Third, equality can also be sought ex post, that is, after uncertainty has been resolved, which
is related to the idea of egalitarianism (cf. Deutsch 1985). With uncertainty perfect equality
is impossible to achieve, however. It can be best approximated by choosing allocations that
minimize the expected difference between U ’s and C’s final positions. In our set-up this is
equivalent to minimizing expected differences in individuals’ final utility of money. Note that,
ex post equal allocations do not depend on risk attitudes because the justice idea is applied after
uncertainty is resolved. Consequently, ex post just allocations xU and xC have to satisfy
min
xU ,xC
p
∣∣kHxU − xC∣∣+ (1− p)
∣∣∣klxU − xC
∣∣∣ s.t. xU + xC = X.
The solution of the above minimization problem yields
xU =
1
kH + 1
X, xC =
kH
kH + 1
X if kH >
1− p
p
,
xU =
1
kl + 1
X, xC =
kl
kl + 1
X if kH <
1− p
p
.
(4)
In the first case, when kH is relatively large, this implies that the allocation to the recipient
exposed to uncertainty is smaller than the allocation to the recipient facing certainty (recall that
kH > 1 > kl) and in the second case, when kH is relatively small, the allocation to the recipient
exposed to uncertainty is larger than the allocation to the recipient facing certainty. We call this
justice idea ex post equality.
10The formal proofs of these and the subsequently presented theoretical results are presented in Appendix A.
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The three justice principles discussed so far ignore efficiency considerations. However, ef-
ficiency is not necessarily at odds with justice, but can itself be considered a type of justice
(cf. Konow 2003). To account for efficiency considerations, we assume a utilitarian allocation
criterion that maximizes the aggregate level of (expected) utility.11
When recipients are identical and risk neutral the utilitarian principle does not select a unique
allocation and any allocation of X would be considered as just. However, if recipients are risk
averse a given allocation yields less expected utility to U than to C and utilitarianism prescribes
to allocate a smaller amount to U than to C. Formally, the allocations xU and xC have to satisfy
max
xU ,xC
E[W (xU ) +W (xC)] s.t. xU + xC = X,
which, given our assumptions, is equivalent to
max
xU ,xC
p(xU k
H)α + (1− p) (xU k
l)α + (xC)
α s.t. xU + xC = X,
and gives the just allocations
xU =
1
exp(−Z (1− α)−1) + 1
X, xC =
exp(−Z (1− α)−1)
exp(−Z (1− α)−1) + 1
X, (5)
with Z = ln[p(kH)α + (1− p)(kl)α]. We call these just allocations utilitarian.
Note, that exp(−Z (1 − α)−1) > 1 for all α ∈ ]0, 1[ implies that in the just allocations given
by (5), U is allocated less than C. Further, it holds that the higher the riskiness of U ’s final
earnings the less is allocated to U . If α > 1, that is when recipients are characterized by risk
seeking preferences, the maximization of total welfare implies that all X is allocated to U .
Table 1 summarizes the distributional implications of these four views of justice under un-
certainty. It also shows the relation of just allocations to U and C in dependence of whether risk
averse or risk seeking preferences are assumed.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
The experiment consists of three parts: (1) the production of the resource X by recipients C
and U , (2) the allocation of X between by C and U by the uninvolved spectator, and (3) the
elicitation of risk preferences, beliefs about risk preferences and other individual characteristics.
In the following we describe the different parts in more detail.
11In our context, the related concept of Pareto efficiency does not have any discriminatory power, as any
allocation satisfying xU + xC = X is Pareto efficient.
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Table 1: Just Allocations under Uncertainty
Relation between xU and xC
xU Risk averse Risk seeking
EV-equality 12X xU = xC xU = xC
EU-equality 1exp(Zα−1)+1X xU > xC xU < xC
Ex post-equality*
1
kH+1
X xU < xC xU < xC
1
kl+1
X xU > xC xU > xC
Utilitarian 1
exp(−Z(1−α)−1)+1
X xU < xC xU > xC
Note: Z = ln[p(kH)α + (1 − p)(kl)α]; * upper (lower) case holds if kH > (<) 1−p
p
; in
the experiment only the upper case is implemented.
Part 1: production of resource X. Each participant is randomly assigned a seat in a
vision isolated cubicle equipped with a networked computer. After each participant is seated,
instructions for the first and second part of the experiment are distributed and read aloud by
the experimenter. Participants are randomly matched into groups of three and assigned the role
of either recipient U , recipient C, or spectator. These roles are fixed throughout the experiment.
In the experiment subjects are assigned the neutral labels A, B, and C.
In the first part of the experiment U and C work individually on a real effort task, while
the spectator is idle. The purpose of the task is to create a situation where U and C are
equally entitled to a compensation for their effort. The spectator has the full responsibility to
decide on this compensation. The real effort task consists of the so-called ‘slider task’ introduced
by Gill and Prowse (2012). In our version 32 sliders on horizontal bars are displayed on the
computer screen. Using the mouse, each slider can be moved to any point of the bar and the
actual position of a slider is displayed as a number between 0 and 100 to the right of the bar.
The task is to position as many sliders as possible exactly in the middle of a bar. The slider is
correctly positioned when the number 50 is displayed next to the slider.12 A recipient’s score
in the task, that is his or her productivity, is equal to the number of sliders positioned at 50
in 6 minutes time. During the task the achieved score and the remaining time are displayed at
the top of the screen. We chose the slider task because it is easy to explain and understand, is
identical across repetitions, and does not leave room for guessing.
12Figure E.1 in Appendix E shows examples of the slider task.
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The slider task is incentivized. For each correctly positioned slider AC 0.25 are credited,
implying that each recipient can get credited up to AC 8. After the time for the task has expired,
all members of a group, including the spectator, are informed about the productivity of U and
C and, hence, the total amount of money X generated, which is deposited in a joint account. In
order to minimize the likelihood of productivity differences, and thus to maximize the likelihood
of equally deserving recipients, we have chosen the number of sliders and the available time to
complete the task such that maximum productivity should be achieved by both recipients.
Part 2: just allocation of X. In this part of the experiment the spectator has to allocate
the amount X in the group account between U and C, who are both not active in this part.
Importantly, the spectator does not have any stakes in the joint account and neither U nor C
do receive any compensation other than the one implied by the spectator’s allocation. The spec-
tator’s payment for the allocation task is independent of her decision and randomly determined
at the end of the experiment. Specifically, the spectator can earn 4, 6, 10 or 12 Euro with equal
chance. We have chosen this payment procedure in order to maximize the likelihood that the
third party’s only incentive is to implement her normative just allocation. Further, we strove to
minimize a potential experimenter demand effect regarding the equal division, by not including
8 as a possible outcome.
A crucial assumption here is that the spectator’s choices indeed reflect just allocations. Specif-
ically, one may wonder whether the spectator may not (only) have an incentive to act justly but
that, due to missing direct monetary incentives, her choices may also involve a random compo-
nent. We do not deny this possibility but it should be noted that the elicitation of just choices
requires by definition an uninvolved decision maker. In our opinion, the chosen implementation is
as close as one can get to incentivizing just choices. Moreover, we do not think that randomness
will play a major role in the spectator’s decisions for the following reasons. First, there are theo-
retical arguments and empirical facts that support the assumption that participants will indeed
decide according to their view of justice. Theoretically, Konow (2000), Karni and Safra (2002),
and Birkeland and Tungodden (2014), for instance, argue that individuals suffer some disutility
when actual allocations deviate from what they deem to be just and thus have an (intrinsic)
incentive to choose just allocations. Empirically, it has been shown that uninvolved third parties
indeed implement just choices (see, e.g., Konow 2000, Cappelen et al. 2013). Second, we show
in the results section that it is unlikely that in our experiment spectators made random choices.
Third, in answers of subjects to open post-experiment questions we do not find any evidence that
11
subjects’ choices where guided by randomness. For all these reasons and for brevity, throughout
the paper we refer to the spectator’s allocation choices with the expression just allocations.
The spectator faces allocation problems that satisfy the assumptions discussed above and
are summarized in Table 2.13 The allocation problem 1-Certainty serves as a benchmark where
the final earnings of both, U and C, are certain and thus equal to the amounts xU and xC
allocated to them. In the other four allocation problems recipient U is exposed to uncertainty
while C faces certainty. In 2-Risk recipient U earns kH = 1.5 times what is allocated to her with
probability p = 0.5 and with probability 1− p = 0.5 she earns only half her allocation (kl = 0.5).
The remaining allocation problems are constructed similarly. For instance, in 4-Risk p = 0.5,
kH = 2, and kl = 0, implying that U earns either twice what is allocated to her or nothing, both
events having a chance of 50 percent. It is easy to see that expected earnings of U are exactly xU
in all allocation problems and that the riskiness monotonically increases from allocation problem
1-Certainty to 5-Risk.
Table 2: Allocation Problems.
Allocation problem Final earnings of U Final earnings of C
1-Certainty xU xC
2-Risk (0.5 : xU · 1.5, xU · 0.5) xC
3-Risk (0.8 : xU · 1.25, xU · 0) xC
4-Risk (0.5 : xU · 2, xU · 0) xC
5-Risk (0.2 : xU · 5, xU · 0) xC
Note: (p : xU ·k
H , xU ·k
l) denotes the uncertain outcome U is facing; xU + xR = X .
In the experiment, these allocation problems appear on the screen one by one and each
spectator has to make an allocation decision in each problem. In order to control for sequencing
effects, the order in which allocation problems appear is randomized in each group. At the end
of the experiment one problem is randomly selected to be relevant for payment of U and C and
uncertainty is resolved by using a stack of cards numbered from 1 to 100. For instance, for an
allocation problem where U faces a 50 percent chance that her allocation is doubled, this indeed
happens if a card with a number smaller than 51 is drawn. The determination of earnings took
place publicly at the end of the experiment so that subjects could witness how uncertainty was
resolved. Subjects were informed about this procedure before they made any decisions.
13For the discussion on allocation problems characterized by ambiguity we refer the reader to Appendix F.
12
Part 3: elicitation of individual characteristics. In the last part of the experiment we
gather data on risk preferences, beliefs about risk preferences and other individual characteristics
that could be related to allocation decisions of the spectator. In order to measure risk preferences
we elicit the certainty equivalents of six two outcomes lotteries (cf. Fehr-Duda et al. 2006). For
each lottery subjects are asked to choose between the lottery and a number of decreasing sure
payments. Certainty equivalents are calculated as the arithmetic mean of the smallest sure
amount preferred to the lottery and the consecutive sure amount on the list. Subjects are
forced to switch from the sure payment to the lottery only once, as consistency is crucial for
the successive elicitation of beliefs about others’ preferences. Details of the used lotteries are
presented in Table G.1 of Appendix G and a screen-shot of a typical lottery can be found in
the experiment instructions (Appendix E). The parameters of the lotteries are chosen such that
they allow to measure risk preferences for the same outcome ranges as used in the allocation
problems. At the end of the experiment one decision is randomly selected to be relevant for
payment and earnings are added to those of the first part.
Subjects’ beliefs about others’ risk preferences are elicited by letting them estimate the choices
of a randomly matched group member in four lotteries. Belief elicitation is incentivized with the
interval scoring rule (Schlag and van der Weele 2015). Each participant is asked to indicate what
s/he believes is the minimum and the maximum certainty equivalent of the matched participant
for each lottery.14
At the end of the third part of the experiment subjects are asked some socioeconomic ques-
tions and spectators are in addition asked questions regarding their decisions in the first part of
the experiment. Thereafter subjects are privately payed out in cash and dismissed.
The computerized experiment was conducted in the Behavioral and Experimental Economics
laboratory (BEElab) at Maastricht University School of Business and Economics, using the z-tree
software (Fischbacher 2007). In total 90 students from Maastricht University participated in the
experiment. Most of them (82 percent) were enrolled in the School of Business and Economics
and the rest came from a variety of studies, such as law, medicine and arts. 47 percent of
the subjects were male and the average age was 23.5 years. An experimental session lasted
approximately 80 minutes and the average earnings per subject were AC 17.
14The interval scoring rule has two advantages compared to other belief elicitation procedures. First, it is less
time consuming and less cognitively demanding then eliciting the probabilities over all possible events. Second,
the interval scoring rule allows inferences that are valid under any degree of subjects’ risk aversion and not only
when subjects are risk neutral (Schlag and van der Weele 2015).
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4 Results
In this section we first present descriptive statistics and statistical tests on allocation behavior of
spectators. We then proceed by estimating the distribution of the theoretically derived justice
views in our sample.
4.1 Just Allocations under Uncertainty
Our design of the production phase successfully induced maximum performance of both U and
C in almost all of the 30 groups. Only in two groups maximum performance was not achieved.
In the following analysis we exclude these two groups in order to rule out confounding effects on
spectators’ allocation decisions due to recipients’ productivity differences. Consequently, for all
analyzed groups the amount X that has to be allocated equals AC 16.
To set the stage we consider first allocation problem 1-Certainty in which there is no uncer-
tainty about final earnings. In this problem treating U and C equally unambiguously implies to
split the group account in two equal shares, which is also efficient. Figure 1 depicts the distri-
bution of allocations to U (that is, xU ). It shows that, except for two outliers, spectators split
the amount in the group account indeed equally between U and C. This clearly indicates that
(almost all of) our spectators care about treating equally deserving individuals equally.
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Figure 1: Allocations to Recipient U in 1-Certainty
Result 1. When there is no uncertainty, just allocations amount to splitting the monetary output
equally between recipients.
This result also indicates that our set-up successfully elicits just allocations. Alternatively,
as discussed in Section 3, spectators may not care much about justice and allocate resources
14
more or less randomly. In that case, however, we would expect more widely dispersed allocation
decisions. Additional evidence that allocations in 1-Certainty elicit just allocations, and are not
the outcome of random or unreflected choices, comes from the two groups where one of the
recipients, namely U , did not achieve maximum performance in the real effort task. There we
observe that allocations deviate from the equal split in disfavor of the less productive recipient
U , who correctly positioned only 27 out of 32 sliders (xU = 6.75 and xU = 7.75 in the two
groups respectively). Furthermore, participants’ answers to the debriefing questionnaire provide
additional evidence supporting the idea that spectators are concerned with treating U and C in
a just way (see Appendix D).
Allocation behavior changes drastically in allocation problems with uncertainty. Figure 2
shows the distributions of allocations to recipient U in allocation problems 2-Risk to 5-Risk. The
distributions clearly indicate that just allocations differ across spectators within each allocation
problem as well as across allocation problems.
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Figure 2: Allocations to Recipient U in Allocations Problems with Uncertainty
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Table 3: Allocations to Recipient U
Allocation to U
Allocation problem Mean St.dev. WSR test K-S test
1-Certainty 8.39 1.59 p = 0.16 p = 1.00
2-Risk 8.50 1.43 p = 0.16 p = 0.07
3-Risk 8.13 1.69 p = 0.90 p = 0.01
4-Risk 7.33 2.10 p = 0.12 p = 0.02
5-Risk 5.10 2.84 p = 0.00 p = 0.00
Note: WSR ... Wilcoxon signed-rank, K-S ... Kolmogorov-Smirnov; the
nul hypothesis for both tests is that the true distribution is that all spec-
tators allocate 8 to recipient U .
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics and statistical tests regarding allocations to recipi-
ents U .15 Wilcoxon signed rank (WSR) tests reject the null hypothesis that the median allocation
to U is significantly different from 8 only in allocation problem 5-Risk, where less is allocated to
U (Table 3 column 4). However, WSR tests do not pick up all information contained in the data.
Specifically, they do not capture the large variety of allocations clearly visible in Figure 2. There-
fore, for each allocation problem, we also employ Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests to compare
actual distributions to the hypothetical distribution where an equal split is uniformly chosen. We
find that in all allocation problems with uncertainty the K-S tests detect significant differences
at least at the 5 percent significance level, except for 2-Risk where p = 0.07 (Table 3 column 5).
Result 2. In each allocation problem characterized by uncertainty just allocations are widely
dispersed and differ significantly from the equal-split.
The distributions depicted in Figure 2 also suggest that spectators allocation decisions are
related to the problems’ riskiness, which increases from 2-Risk to 5-Risk. To test this, we code
each allocation problem with a dummy variable and regress the allocations to U on these dummy
variables. Allocation problem 1-Certainty serves as the baseline problem. Table 4 reports the
OLS regression results.
The dummy’s coefficients show that on average just allocations to recipient U tend to become
smaller the higher the riskiness of the allocation problem. Specifically, for the relatively high-risk
problems, 4-Risk and 5-Risk, just allocations to U are significantly smaller than in the allocation
15All reported statistical tests are two-sided.
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Table 4: Allocation to U in Dependence of Allocation Problem
Decision situation Coefficient Std. Err
1-Certainty (constant) 8.39∗∗∗ (0.306)
2-Risk 0.11 (0.310)
3-Risk −0.26 (0.378)
4-Risk −1.06∗∗ (0.485)
5-Risk −3.31∗∗∗ (0.703)
N 140
R2 0.296
F(4,27) 6.593
Note: ∗∗∗(∗∗) indicates significance at the 1 (5) percent
level; OLS regression; standard errors are robust to het-
eroscedasticity and are clustered on the 28 subjects.
problem without uncertainty (1-Certainty). Testing for differences between the coefficients of
the different allocation problems with uncertainty shows that 5-Risk is significantly smaller than
4-Risk (F (1, 27) = 18.47, p < 0.001). Further, 4-Risk is smaller, but not significantly, than
3-Risk (F (1, 27) = 2.23, p = 0.15) and 3-Risk is also smaller, but not significantly, than 2-Risk
(F (1, 27) = 1.71, p = 0.20). We summarize these observations in the following result.
Result 3. Allocations to recipients exposed to uncertainty tend to decrease with increasing riski-
ness of the allocation problem. Specifically, in comparison to the allocation problem without risk,
these allocations are significantly smaller in the allocation problems with highest risks (4-Risk
and 5-Risk).
The result indicates that the average allocation to recipient U is unaffected when moving
from 1-Certainty to relatively little uncertainty in 2-Risk and 3-Risk. As noted above already,
this only holds for the first moments but not for the spread of allocations (cf. Figures 1 and 2,
Table 3). Moreover, in view of our theoretical justice views this is not surprising as different views
predict different responses to increasing uncertainty. EV-equality predicts no effect of a change
in uncertainty whereas EU-equality predicts an increase (decrease) in allocations to recipient U
with increasing uncertainty, given that recipients are risk-averse (risk-seeking). Ex-post equality
predicts a decrease in allocations to recipient U irrespective of risk preferences and utilitarianism
predicts a decrease for risk-averse preferences but no effect for risk-seeking preferences. (cf.
the discussion of justice views in Section 2 and the summary of predicted allocations shown
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in Table 1). These non-effects and off-setting effects, respectively, make it unlikely to detect
differences in average allocations, especially when the introduced uncertainty is relatively small,
as in 2-Risk and 3-Risk. The result thus is consistent with the idea that different spectators
adhere to different views of justice under uncertainty. In the following section we discuss this
idea more thoroughly.
4.2 Views of Justice under Uncertainty
The large variety in just allocations within each allocation problem suggests that spectators
have differing views of justice under uncertainty. To further investigate this we use our discussed
theoretical justice views to calculate for each of them the implied allocations (cf. Section 2). For
some of these views, just allocations depend on risk preferences of recipients, which are unknown
to the spectators. To deal with this, we use the spectators’ elicited beliefs about recipients’ risk
preferences to predict individual just allocations for each proposed justice view.16 We then use
these predictions to attribute to each spectator the justice view that best fits her actual just
allocations.
In a first step, we estimate for each spectator her believed risk preferences of recipients, using
the believed certainty equivalents elicited in the lottery tasks in Part 3 of the experiment. In line
with the theory section, we assume that recipients’ preferences can be represented by a CRRA
utility function for money W (x) = xα. We then estimate the value of the believed α for each
spectator by minimizing the sum of squared distances between predicted and elicited believed
certainty equivalents (Wakker 2008, 2010).17 We find that the average estimated level of risk
aversion of recipients as believed by spectators is moderate (mean α = 0.72, st.dev. = 0.23,
median α = 0.72). These values are in keeping with risk aversion reported in the literature (cf.
Holt and Laury 2002, Dohmen et al. 2011).18
16Further below we also discuss the implications when using spectators’ elicited own risk preferences.
17Formally, α is chosen such that
min
α
6∑
i=1
[(piy
α
i + (1− pi)z
α
i )
1
α − cei]
2
,
where the first term in brackets indicates the theoretically predicted certainty equivalent for lottery i and cei is
the elicited believed certainty equivalent of lottery i. To correct for heteroscedasticity lotteries are normalized to
uniform length.
18We find that men and women do not differ in their believed risk preferences (male α=0.73, female α=0.72;
Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.75).
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In a second step, we calculate the theoretical just allocations according to each justice view
for each allocation problem and each spectator. Recall that just allocations according to EV-
equality are independent of risk preferences and the riskiness of the allocation problem, that
just allocations according to ex post equality are independent of risk preferences but affected by
the riskiness of the allocation problem, and that just allocations according to EU-equality and
utilitarianism are, in opposite ways, influenced by both, risk preferences and the riskiness of the
allocation problem (cf. Table 1).
Finally, we use these predictions to estimate for each spectator which justice view best rep-
resents her actual just allocations across problems. To this end, for each spectator and each
allocation problem under uncertainty, we calculate the squared distance between the observed
allocation and each of the four theoretical just allocations. The justice view that minimizes the
sum of squared residuals over all risky problems is the one that best represents a spectator’s
justice type. Formally, for each spectator i we estimate
min
j
5∑
m=2
(ymi − x
j,m
i )
2, (6)
where ymi is the actual amount allocated by spectator i to recipient Ui in allocation problem m
and xj,mi is the amount recipient Ui should receive in allocation problem m according to justice
view j ∈ {EV-equality,EU-equality, ex post equality,utilitarian} of i.
Result 4. Spectators exhibit fundamentally different views of justice under uncertainty. Specifi-
cally, in our sample, 43 percent are best represented by EV-equality, 36 percent by utilitarianism,
14 percent by ex post equality, and 7 percent by EU-equality.
The result shows that all justice views are represented, indicating that the observed variation
in just allocations is due to fundamentally different views of justice under uncertainty. A relative
majority of spectators is best represented by EV-equality that equalizes expected earnings of both
recipients. This coincides with the equal-split of resources in the allocation problem without
uncertainty, indicating that these spectators do not adapt their just allocations to recipients
facing uncertainty. However, a majority of 57 percent of the spectators is best represented by
justice views that do respond to uncertainty. Of these, the largest group of 36 percent can be
classified as utilitarians who allocate the less to U the more risk averse they believe U is and
the riskier the allocation problem is. A non-negligible minority of 14 percent adopts the ex
post equality view, which allocates less to U the higher the riskiness of the allocation problem,
irrespective of recipients’ risk preferences. The smallest group of spectators is the one best
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represented by EU-equality, who are those who compensate U for facing uncertainty. They give
more to recipient U than to recipient C in all allocation problems and the more so the riskier
the allocation problem.
We want to emphasize that the estimated percentages should be taken with a pinch of salt
as measurement errors and environmental factors may affect the precise values, especially in
a relatively small sample like the one of our experiment. What the result clearly indicates
however is that spectators do differ fundamentally in their ideas about just allocations under
uncertainty.19
One may wonder how well our theory-based classification fits the data. To get a first indi-
cation we looked at the absolute differences between the actual allocations and the predicted
allocations. More specifically, for each spectator and each decision situation we calculated the
absolute difference between her actual allocation and the allocation according to the assigned
justice view, and then calculated the average across decision situations. Figure 3 shows a box-
plot of this measure for each justice view. As can be seen, the differences (measured in AC) are
relatively small with not much variation, neither across spectators for a given justice view, nor
across justice views. In the following we explore the fit more thoroughly with some additional
statistical analysis.
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Figure 3: Average absolute differences between actual and predicted allocations by justice views
Note: Horizontal lines indicate medians, boxes indicate interquartile ranges.
19In line with the literature (Eckel and Grossman 2008), female participants have more risk averse own risk
preferences than male participants, although not statistically significantly so (male α=0.82, female α=0.74; Mann-
Whitney test, p = 0.46).
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First, we regress the observed allocations on those predicted by each spectators justice type,
clustering standard errors at the individual level. If the classification would be perfect, the
estimated constant should be 0 and the coefficient of predicted allocations should be 1. We
find that the constant is close to 0 and insignificant (coeff.: 0.750, F (1, 27) = 1.35, p = 0.256),
the coefficient of predicted allocations is close to 1 and insignificantly different from it (coeff:
0.952, F (1, 27) = 0.26, p = 0.615), and R2 = 0.53. Hence, the regression result shows that our
classification provides a good fit and that spectators behavior is to a considerable extent guided
by (diverging) views of justice under uncertainty.20
Second, we test whether our classification is able to capture a larger fraction of the data
variability than a random classification procedure. To this end, we uniformly randomly assign a
justice type to each spectator and then regress the observed allocations on the ones ‘predicted’ by
the random assignment. We conduct 100 regressions, corresponding to 100 random assignments
of types, and find that the R2 is at best 0.20 and on average equal to 0.04. This is much lower
than the obtained R2 = 0.53 when using our classification.
Third, we conduct robustness tests where we exclude one of the four justice views at a time.
That is, for all four possible permutations, we first use the same classification procedure as
described above using only three of the theoretically derived views of justice and then regress
the observed allocations on those predicted by each spectator’s (possibly new) justice type. If
the proposed four theoretical views of justice indeed capture participants justice ideas under
uncertainty, we expect (a) that even using only three justice views gives a reasonable good fit
that is better than with the random classification procedure but (b) that the fit of the remaining
three views is worse than in the full model. To test this, we apply the same regression analysis
as above. We find that, depending on which justice view is dropped, the R2’s vary between 0.42
and 0.51 and are thus indeed lower than when using all four justice views but significantly larger
than for the random assignment procedure. Interestingly, in some of the alternative specifications
the constant is even significantly different from 0 or the coefficient of the predicted allocation is
20The regression Table C.1 can be found in Appendix C. We have also estimated the frequency of different
justice views assuming that spectators’ believed risk preferences are represented by a CARA utility function for
money. We find that the distribution of types slightly differ from using the CRRA specification. Importantly, we
still find that spectators seem to have fundamentally different views of justice under uncertainty. However, we also
find that goodness of fit under the CARA assumption is much worse (coeff. of constant: 3.897, F (1, 27) = 5.14,
p = 0.032; coeff. of predicted allocation: 0.467, F (1, 27) = 4.24, p = 0.049; R2 = 0.21). Therefore, we consider
the CRRA specification as a better representation of spectators believed risk preferences.
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significantly different from 1, indicating a considerably worse fit.21 We are therefore confident
that our theory-based classification is a good representation of spectators’ actual justice types.
We have used spectators’ believed risk preferences of recipients to determine their justice type.
Alternatively, one could take spectators’ own risk preferences. Using the certainty equivalents
elicited in Part 3 of the experiment and applying the same estimation techniques as explained
above, we find that spectators’ own risk preferences are similar to their believed risk preferences
(mean α = 0.77, st.dev. = 0.24, median α = 0.79) and statistically not significantly different
(WSR test, p = 0.17). Still one may ask how robust our results are to a change in used risk
preferences.
We run the same procedure as above to calculate the predicted just allocations according
to the four theoretical views of justice for spectators’ own risk preferences. Unsurprisingly, the
estimated percentages of the different justice views differ from those when using believed risk
preferences. In particular, we find that 39 percent of the spectators are best represented by
EV-equality, 29 percent by utilitarianism, 18 percent by ex post equality, and 14 percent by
EU-equality. Importantly, however, the changes are moderate and ranking of frequencies of
justice views is preserved. Moreover, testing the goodness of fit shows that, also when using
own preferences, our classification captures actual allocations pretty well. The R2 is with 0.50
slightly lower than with believed preferences, but both the estimated constant and predicted
allocation is not significantly different from 0 (p = 0.23) and 1 (p = 0.45), respectively.22 In sum,
although the exact estimated frequencies of justice types differ when assuming spectators’ own
preferences as opposed to using their beliefs about recipients’ preferences, we can conclude that
the ability of our theoretical approach to describe allocation behavior does not strongly hinge on
these assumptions.
So far we have assumed that spectators endorse one single justice view, which is either
utilitarianism, capturing efficiency concerns, or one of the three principles of equality. It is
however conceivable that a spectator may care about both equality and efficiency at the same
time. In that case, a spectator’s allocation decisions would be the result of a convex combination
of the allocations predicted by one of the equality ideals and utilitarianism. To explore this idea
of combined justice views, we assume that each spectator attributes a weight γ to utilitarianism
21Tables C.2–C.5 in Appendix C report the regression and test results. We have also explored classifications
using only two or one of the theoretical justice views. In all cases, these categorizations perform worse (regression
and test results are available from the authors upon request).
22Table C.6 in Appendix C reports the regression and test results.
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and 1 − γ to one equality principle (either EV-equality, EU-equality or ex post equality). We
then use the actual allocations to estimate for each of these three combined justice ideas the best
fitting value of γ at the individual level, and determine which of the resulting combined justice
ideas fits the allocations best. More specifically, for each combined justice idea, we calculate
the best fitting γ by minimizing the sum of squared residuals between predicted and observed
allocations. The combined justice idea that yields the smallest residuals is then attributed to
the spectator, along with its associated γ. Table 5 summarizes our findings.
Table 5: Best-fitting Combined Justice Ideas
Equality view Fraction of spectators
Mean weight on
utilitarianism (γ)
EU-equality 29% 0.76
EV-equality 57% 0.31
Ex post equality 14% 0.33
The table shows that when combined with utilitarianism, the most frequent equality based
justice idea is EV-equality, which is attributed to 57 percent of the spectators. It is followed
by EU-equality with 29 percent and ex-post equality with 14 percent. The best-fitting weight
γ on utilitarianism varies strongly with the equality based justice ideas (mean γ: 0.76 for EU-
equality, 0.31 for EV-equality, 0.33 for ex-post equality). When comparing the distribution of
the individual-level residuals, we observe that they are significantly smaller when allocations
are predicted by combined justice ideas than when using single justice views (t-test p < 0.01).
This is not surprising as the former adds a parameter and hence a degree of freedom, which
makes it easier to capture the variability in the allocation data. Importantly, this does not
necessarily imply that an approach based on combined justice views is closer to the “true” model
of individual behavior.23 Most importantly, the results for combined justice ideas confirm that
there is considerable heterogeneity in spectators’ views of justice under uncertainty.
23In fact, when we regress the observed allocations on the ones predicted by each spectator’s combined justice
view (like we did above when assuming single justice views), we find that the intercept is marginally significantly
different from 0 (coeff.: −1.216, F (1, 27) = 3.77, p = 0.063) and the coefficient of the predicted allocations is
significantly different from 1 (coeff: 1.21, F (1, 27) = 4.84, p = 0.036). Due to the increased degree of freedom, the
R2 is with 0.62 somewhat higher than for single justice views. These results suggest that combining justice views
allows capturing a larger fraction of the variability in the data, but provides a worse fit than achieved when using
single justice views.
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4.3 Inequality Averse Spectators
In our experiment spectators do not have any material stakes in the group account and we
therefore assumed that they make allocation decisions according to their normative views of
justice. In Section 3 (Part 2) we have argued that this assumption is justified both on theoretical
and empirical grounds. It is also in line with important literature on the topic (cf. Konow
2000, Cappelen et al. 2013). Nevertheless, as different allocations lead to different (expected)
distributions of earnings among the spectator and the two recipients, it may be conceivable
that spectators are motivated by inequality aversion instead of normative justice views. In the
following we discuss this possibility.
In our experiment spectators do not have the power to redistribute money between themselves
and the recipients, as their earnings are unrelated to their choices in the allocation problems.
They can however influence how recipients’ expected earnings are distributed. Originally, models
of other-regarding preferences were developed for decisions where the consequences of allocation
decisions are known with certainty (cf. Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000).
Recently, Saito (2013) has developed a model of other-regarding preferences under uncertainty
based on Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Importantly, Saito (2013) models a decision maker that cares
both about inequality in ex-ante expected payoffs and in ex-post realized outcomes.
We use this model to derive a spectator’s optimal allocations for each decision situation under
uncertainty. Table 6 relates the optimal allocations to U to the relative importance of ex-ante
inequality aversion, captured by δ in the model.24
Table 6: Optimal Allocations for Inequality Averse Spectators with ‘Saito Utility’
Allocation problem δ = 0 δ ∈ [0, 1/17[ δ ∈ [1/17, 1/5[ δ ∈ [1/5, 1/3[ δ ∈ [1/3, 1]
2-Risk 20/3 8
3-Risk [6, 8] 8
4-Risk [5, 6] 6 8
5-Risk [12/5, 4] 4 6 8
Note: δ is the weight put on ex-ante payoffs and 1− δ is the weight put on ex-post payoffs.
24We focus on strictly inequality averse spectators and on allocation problems with uncertainty. For narrowly
selfish spectators any allocation xU ∈ [0, 16] is optimal in each allocation problem. In 1-Certainty inequity averse
spectators’ optimal allocation to U is 8. In Appendix B the model of Saito (2013) is described in more detail and
we provide the proof of the results shown in the table.
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Our experiment was not designed to estimate individual spectator’s values of δ and
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) inequality parameters. We therefore will limit our discussion to con-
siderations on how the model performs at the aggregate level.
A first observation is that in all allocation problems the predicted allocation to U is at most
8. Hence, the model does not capture the fact that actual allocations to U are frequently larger
than 8, especially in 2-Risk and 3-Risk (32 and 29 percent of all allocations, respectively), but
also in 4-Risk and 5-Risk (18 and 7 percent, respectively; cf. Figure 2).
Second, using the actual allocations in one decision situation we can make inferences on
the values of δ and check whether allocations in other decision situations are consistent with the
model’s predictions. For instance, in 5-Risk 68 percent of spectators choose an allocation xU < 8.
Assuming that the model is correct, that would imply a δ < 1/3 for this fraction of spectators
(cf. Table 6, first and 5-Risk row). Hence, about the same fraction of spectators should choose
to allocate 5 or 6 to U in 4-Risk (cf. Table 6, first and 4-Risk row). This however happens
only for 32 percent of all spectators, leaving at least 36 percent of choices inconsistent with the
model’s predictions. Alternatively, one can start with the observation that in 5-Risk 36 percent
of spectators allocate to U an amount strictly larger than 6, which implies a δ ≥ 1/3. For this
value of δ, we should then observe a similar share of spectators choosing allocations above 6 in
4-Risk and allocations exactly equal to 8 in 3-Risk and 2-Risk. We see however that in 4-Risk 64
percent of spectators choose an allocation above 6, and that in 3-Risk and 2-Risk, respectively,
29 and 50 percent of spectators choose the equal split. Hence, although allocations patterns in
5-Risk and 3-Risk may be viewed as being consistent with the idea that spectators are inequality
averse, the allocation patterns in 2-Risk and 4-Risk can hardly be reconciled with the model’s
predictions.
Finally, it is noteworthy that spectators characterized by δ > 1/3 are predicted to choose an
equal split in all allocation decisions. That is, equal allocations between recipients are optimal
in all allocation problems for spectators even if they are no too much concerned about ex-ante
equality, while only relatively small values of δ < 1/3 can justify allocating less than the equal
split to U .
To summarize, the idea that spectators care about how their own earnings compare to those of
the recipients is certainly appealing but does not receive strong support by our data. In addition,
qualitative evidence from the responses to the debriefing questionnaire shows that spectators
never refer to their own earnings when explaining their allocation decisions, but instead use
arguments consistent with normative justice ideas (cf. Appendix D).
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5 Concluding Remarks
Our study provides first empirical evidence on justice views of uninvolved decision makers (spec-
tators) when recipients of resources are exposed to different levels of uncertainty. We find that
spectators treat equally deserving recipients very differently when one of them is exposed to
uncertainty and that there is pronounced disagreement on what constitutes a just treatment.
This holds even though under certainty there is an implicit agreement among spectators to split
resources equally between recipients. We also find that just allocations respond to the degree
of uncertainty: spectators tend to allocate the less to the recipient exposed to uncertainty the
higher this uncertainty is. Our study further offers a theoretical framework to think about nor-
mative justice views under uncertainty and we provide evidence that the proposed framework is
able to organize spectators’ allocation choices well.
Due to our subject pool and experimental design, our results are generated in the absence
of large socio-economic differences or biases due to self-interest. Thus, our results indicate that
even in the absence of these potentially important factors influencing justice ideas, there is not
necessarily a consensus about what constitutes just policies to tackle societal or economical
problems. Therefore, it can be expected that differences in justice views are more pronounced
in contexts where people also differ in socio-economic backgrounds, ideology or self-interest.
Although one has to be careful in drawing general conclusions from an experiment, our results
suggest that heterogeneity in justice views may play an important part in the regular occurrence
of controversies surrounding allocation problems with uncertain outcomes. In health care, the
public debate in Italy regarding the issue of whether or not taking into account health risks in
the allocation of health resources is an example at hand (Simoes et al. 2012). Fundamentally
different views of justice may also underlie the debates among medical ethics concerning the
fairness of organ allocation policies (Childress 2001, Persad et al. 2009) and the discussion on fair
compensations for employees in risky jobs, such as police forces and fireman (Moore and Viscusi
1990). More generally, the observed heterogeneity of justice views helps explaining how the
public support for different policies may differ depending on their perceived expected effects.
The results we derive are also relevant for the design of employment contracts in the private
sector. In various types of businesses, individuals are assigned to projects that differ in their
riskiness. Our results imply that compensations may need to be adjusted to take those different
risks into account, and that individuals may disagree on the magnitudes of such compensations.
Notably, seminar and conference audience regularly failed in correctly predicting spectators’
behavior in the experiment. This anecdotal evidence demonstrates that even experts find it
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difficult to anticipate views of justice under uncertainty. For policy makers this may be even
more difficult. In order to implement sustainable policies, it seems therefore advisable for policy
makers to acquire knowledge on the distribution of justice ideas. Alternatively policy makers
could propose multiple solutions inspired by justice views, and ask the population directly in
referendums about their preference. Moreover, our results also show that the possibility to
reach a consensus is related to the characteristics of the allocation problem: the higher the
uncertainty, the more individuals’ opinions may differ from each other. This suggests that
reducing (perceived) uncertainty through, for example, information provision, may be a way to
bring individuals’ opinion on just policies closer to each other.
We consider our study as a first step toward a better understanding of people’s views on
justice under uncertainty. Naturally, many questions remain open that may provide interesting
avenues for future research. In order to achieve clean comparisons, we have implemented a
mean preserving spread when varying the degree of uncertainty. It would be interesting to
explore whether our results generalize to other forms of uncertainty. Moreover, in order to avoid
confounds, a special feature of our design is that recipients are equally deserving. In future
research it would be interesting to investigate just allocation decisions under uncertainty when
people are unequal at the outset. Our results could serve as a basis for predictions in these
circumstances and help to understand how it interacts with the pluralism of fairness ideals when
people differ in degrees of deservingness (Cappelen et al. 2007). Further, in our study uncertainty
is exogenous and it would be interesting to investigate how justice views change when individuals
choose their risk exposure (cf. Cappelen et al. 2013, Cettolin and Tausch 2015). Future empirical
research on justice views would also benefit from the use of large representative samples, which
allow investigating the individual characteristics and preferences associated to justice views.
There are many other possible extensions of our design that would allow studying other
interesting and realistic situations. For example, situations where risk is affecting the outcomes
of both recipients or where chances, rather than resources, need to be allocated. Given that
our experiment is one of the first on the topic, we have deliberately chosen a relatively simple
environment.
We have focused on justice views and, thus, on allocation decisions of uninvolved decision
makers. It has been shown that when people have stakes in a distribution problem they tend
to interpret fairness in a way that is beneficial for themselves (see, e.g. Babcock et al. 1995,
Babcock and Loewenstein 1997, Ga¨chter and Riedl 2005, Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido
2012). Such self-serving biases seem to emerge especially when information on the relation
27
between actions and outcomes can be selectively chosen or interpreted (Dana et al. 2006, 2007),
which is certainly the case in environments characterized by uncertainty. Furthermore, since it
has been reported that subjects strongly dislike uncertain environments (Gneezy et al. 2006),
it is perceivable that stakeholders exposed to uncertainty are particularly prone to self-serving
biases. Thus, another interesting extension of our study could be to investigate behavior of
stakeholders who are exposed to uncertainty (similar to, e.g., in Brock et al. 2013), and relate it
to possibly self-serving interpretations of justice. Our results on the prevalence and pluralism of
views of justice under uncertainty provide a necessary first step for such investigations.
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Appendix
A Just Allocations under Uncertainty: Analytical Derivations
Here we formally derive the just allocations according to the justice views EU-equality, ex post equality,
and utilitarianism, respectively, discussed in Section 2 of the main text.
A.1 EU-equality
EU-equality requires equalization of expected utilities, that is
E[W (xU )] = E[W (xC)] s.t. xU + xC = X.
Assuming W (x) = xα, using the definition of our allocation problems (see equation (1) in the main text)
and substituting the constraint we can rewrite the previous equations as
p (xU k
H)α + (1− p) (xU k
l)α = (X − xU )
α
⇔
lnxαU + ln(p(k
H)α + (1− p)(kl)α) = ln(X − xU )
α.
Define Z := ln[p(kH)α + (1 − p)(kl)α] and rewrite the previous equation to
α lnxU + Z = α ln(X − xU )
⇔
X
xU
− 1 = exp(Zα−1),
which after some more rearrangements gives the just allocations to U and C as
xEU−eqU =
1
exp(Zα−1) + 1
X, xEU−eqC =
exp(Zα−1)
exp(Zα−1) + 1
X.

A.2 Ex post equality
Ex post equality requires the minimization of inequality after uncertainty has been resolved, that is, using
the definition of our allocation problems (see equation (1) in the main text),
min
xU ,xC
p
∣∣kHxU − xC ∣∣+ (1− p) ∣∣klxU − xC ∣∣ s.t. xU + xC = X.
Substituting the constraint, the minimization problem becomes
min
xU
p
∣∣xU (kH + 1)−X)∣∣+ (1− p) ∣∣xU (kl + 1)−X∣∣ .
In order to find the minimizing xU we have to distinguish three cases.
case 1 xU ≥
X
kl+1
(⇒ xU ≥
X
kH+1 ):
That is, min
xU
p[xU (k
H + 1)−X)] + (1− p)[xU (k
l + 1)−X ] :
∂
∂xU
= p(kH + 1) + (1 − p)(kl + 1) > 0⇒
xU =
X
kl + 1
minimizes the function.
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case 2 xU ≤
X
kH+1 (⇒ xU ≤
X
kl+1
):
That is, min
xU
p[X − xU (k
H + 1))] + (1− p)[X − xU (k
l + 1)] :
∂
∂xU
= −p(kH + 1)− (1 − p)(kl + 1) < 0⇒
xU =
X
kH + 1
minimizes the function.
case 3 X
kH+1
≤ xU ≤
X
kl+1
:
That is, min
xU
p[xU (k
H + 1)−X ] + (1− p)[X − xU (k
l + 1)] :
∂
∂xU
= p(kH + 1)− (1− p)(kl + 1),
∂
∂xU
> (<) 0 iff
kH + 1
kL + 1
> (<)
1− p
p
,
using pkH + (1 − p)kl = 1 (equation (1)) this reduces to
∂
∂xU
> (<) 0 iff kH > (<)
1− p
p
.
Hence, for this case the function is minimized at
xU =
X
kH + 1
if kH >
1− p
p
and at xU =
X
kl + 1
if kH <
1− p
p
.
Combining case 3 with case 1 (function is increasing for xU ≥
X
kH+1 ) and case 2 (function is decreasing
for xU ≤
X
kH+1 ) and continuity of the min function in xU it follows that the global minimum is obtained
at x∗U =
X
kH+1 if k
H > 1−p
p
and at x∗U =
X
kl+1
if kH < 1−p
p
.
Therefore, the just allocations under ex post equality are given by
xex post−eqU =
1
kH + 1
X, xex post−eqC =
kH
kH+1X if k
H >
1− p
p
,
xex post−eqU =
1
kl + 1
X, xex post−eqC =
kl
kl+1X if k
H <
1− p
p
.

A.3 Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism requires the maximization of the expected sum of utilities, that is
max
xU ,xC
E[W (xU ) +W (xC)] s.t. xU + xC = X
Again, assumingW (x) = xα, using the definition of our allocation problems (see equation (1) in the main
text) and substituting the constraint we can rewrite the maximization problem as
max
xU
p(xUk
H)α + (1− p)(xUk
l)α + (X − xU )
α.
For 0 < α < 1 the function is concave and the first order condition is given by
∂
∂xU
= αpkH(xUk
H)α−1 + (1− p)αkl(xUk
l)α−1 − α(X − xU )
α−1 = 0
35
⇔ lnxα−1U + ln(p(k
H)α + (1− p)(kl)α) = ln(X − xU )
α−1
Define Z := ln[p(kH)α + (1 − p)(kH)α] and rewrite the previous equation to
lnxα−1U + Z = ln(X − xU )
α−1 ⇔
X
xU
− 1 = exp(−Z(1− α)−1),
which after some more rearrangements gives the just allocations for risk averse recipients as
xutilU =
1
exp(−Z(1− α)−1) + 1
X, xutilC =
exp(−Z(1− α)−1)
exp(−Z(1− α)−1) + 1
X.
When considering risk seeking recipients (α > 1) the function to maximize is convex and, thus, the solution
to the maximization problem is
xutilU = X, x
util
C = 0.

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B Optimal allocations of inequality averse spectators
Saito (2013) introduced a model of inequality aversion under uncertainty. We use this model to derive
predictions of the optimal choices of an inequality averse spectator who takes her own (expected) earnings
into account when making resource allocation decisions between U and C. The ‘Saito utility’ of the
spectator is given by the value function
V (X) = δW (Ep(X)) + (1− δ)Ep(W (X)),
where W corresponds to the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In particular,
W (X) = xS − αΣi=U,Cmax{xi − xS , 0} − βΣi=U,Cmax{xS − xi, 0},
where xS is the material payoff of the spectator, and xU and xC the amounts the spectator allocates to
recipient U and recipient C, respectively. The term W (Ep(X)) captures the utility of expected payoffs
and is referred to as ex ante utility. The term Ep(W (X)) captures the expected utility of ex post payoffs
and is referred to as ex post utility. The parameter δ measures the weight the spectator puts on the ex
ante utility. Following Saito (2013) we assume δ ∈ [0, 1] and for simplicity xU ∈ [0, 16].
25
Proposition B.1. Spectator’s optimal allocation to U when assuming ‘Saito utility’.
(1) Assume α > 0 and β ∈ ]0, 1]. The spectator’s ‘Saito utility’ maximizing allocation x∗U to recipient U
is in
1-Certainty:
x∗U = 8 ∀δ ∈ [0, 1].
2-Risk:
x∗U ∈


{20/3} if δ ∈ [0, 1/17[,
[20/3, 8] if δ = 1/17,
{8} if δ ∈ ]1/17, 1],
3-Risk:
x∗U ∈
{
[6, 8] if δ = 0
{8} if δ ∈ ]0, 1],
4-Risk:
x∗U ∈


[5, 6] if δ = 0,
{6} if δ ∈ ]0, 1/3[,
[6, 8] if δ = 1/3,
{8} if δ ∈ ]1/3, 1],
5-Risk:
x∗U ∈


[12/5, 4] if δ = 0,
{4} if δ ∈ ]0, 1/5[,
[4, 6] if δ = 1/5,
{6} if δ ∈ ]1/5, 1/3[,
[6, 8] if δ = 1/3,
{8} if δ ∈ ]1/3, 1].
(2) Assume α = β = 0. In each allocation problem, the spectator’s ‘Saito utility’ maximizing allocation
x∗U to recipient U is any value in [0, 16].
25The results can be easily adapted for integer values of xU .
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Proof. (1) The spectator’s ex ante utility is given by
W (Ep(X)) = Ep(xS)− αΣi=U,Cmax{Ep(xi)− Ep(xS), 0} − βΣi=U,Cmax{Ep(xS)− Ep(xi), 0}
=
{
8− β(8− xU )− α(xC − 8) if 0 ≤ xU ≤ 8,
8− α(8 − xU )− β(xC − 8) if 8 ≤ xU ≤ 16,
which, with xU + xC = 16, is equivalent to
W (Ep(X)) =
{
8− (α+ β)(8 − xU ) if 0 ≤ xU ≤ 8,
8− (α+ β)(xU − 8) if 8 ≤ xU ≤ 16.
The ex post payoffs of the spectator, recipient U , and recipient C are respectively xS , k
jxU (j = H, l),
and xC .
The payoff of the spectator is randomly determined and can take any value xS ∈ {4, 6, 10, 12} with
probability 1/4 each. Hence, if kj = 0 the payoff of the spectator is always larger than the payoff of recip-
ient U and if kj > 0 is equal to the payoff of recipient U if xS = k
jxU (⇔ xU = xS/k
j). The payoff of the
spectator is equal to the payoff of recipient C if xS = xC = 16− xU (⇔ xU = 16− xS). The terms xS/k
j
and 16− xS thus represent the equality benchmarks of the spectator’s payoff compared to the payoffs of
recipients U and C. Together with the values of kj, these benchmarks distinguish the three following cases.
Case 1: kj > 0 and xS/k
j ≤ 16− xS .
W (X) =


xS − β(xS − k
jxU )− α(16− xS − xU ) if xU ≤ xS/k
j,
xS − α(k
jxU − xS)− α(16− xS − xU ) if xS/k
j ≤ xU ≤ 16− xS ,
xS − α(k
jxU − xS)− β(xS − 16 + xU ) if xU ≥ 16− xS .
Case 2: kj > 0 and 16− xS ≤ xS/k
j .
W (X) =


xS − β(xS − k
jxU )− α(16− xS − xU ) if xU ≤ 16− xS ,
xS − β(xS − k
jxU )− β(xS − 16 + xU ) if 16− xS ≤ xU ≤ xS/k
j,
xS − α(k
jxU − xS)− β(xS − 16 + xU ) if xU ≥ xS/k
j.
Case 3: kj = 0.
W (X) =
{
xS − βxS − α(16− xS − xU ) if xU ≤ 16− xS ,
xS − βxS − β(xS − 16 + xU ) if xU ≥ 16− xS .
The equality benchmark for the ex ante utility is independent of the riskiness of the allocation problem,
and is always equal to the expected payoff of the spectator, i.e., 8. In contrast, for ex post utility, the
equality benchmarks are different in each allocation problem. Based on these general results, we now
explore the optimal allocation of the spectator for each allocation problem.
For each problem, the first step is to obtain all the intervals defined by the equality benchmarks. The
second step is to derive the function W (X) corresponding to the values of xU in different intervals. The
third step is to calculate the ex post utility. Finally, we calculate the first derivative of V (X) w.r.t. xU
and determine the optimal allocation to U .
1-Certainty. In this allocation problem, ex ante and ex post utility are identical and the ‘Saito utility’
is given by
V (X) =W (Ep(X)) = Ep(W (X)) =
{
8− (α+ β)(8 − xU ) if 0 ≤ xU ≤ 8,
8− (α+ β)(xU − 8) if 8 ≤ xU ≤ 16.
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Table B.1: 2-Risk – W (X), V (X) and dV (X)
dxU
for 0 ≤ xU ≤
8
3
Probability W (X)
1
4 ×
1
2 =
1
8 4− β(4− 1.5xU )− α(12 − xU )
1
4 ×
1
2 =
1
8 6− β(6− 1.5xU )− α(10 − xU )
1
4 ×
1
2 =
1
8 10− β(10 − 1.5xU )− α(6 − xU )
1
4 ×
1
2 =
1
8 12− β(12 − 1.5xU )− α(4 − xU )
1
4 ×
1
2 =
1
8 4− β(4− 0.5xU )− α(12 − xU )
1
4 ×
1
2 =
1
8 6− β(6− 0.5xU )− α(10 − xU )
1
4 ×
1
2 =
1
8 10− β(10 − 0.5xU )− α(6 − xU )
1
4 ×
1
2 =
1
8 12− β(12 − 0.5xU )− α(4 − xU )
Ep(W (X)) 8− (α+ β)(8− xU )
W (Ep(X)) 8− (α+ β)(8− xU )
V (X) 8− (α+ β)(8− xU )
dV (X)
dxU
α+ β
Taking the first derivative of V (X) w.r.t. xU , we obtain
dV (X)
dxU
=
{
α+ β if 0 ≤ xU ≤ 8,
−(α+ β) if 8 ≤ xU ≤ 16.
(B.1)
The optimal allocation is thus 8 for all δ ∈ [0, 1].
2-Risk. This problem is characterized by p = 0.5, kH = 1.5, and kl = 0.5. The values of kH and kl
together with the distribution of xS , yield the equality benchmarks 8/3, 4, 6, 20/3, 8, 10, and 12. Using
these benchmarks we can derive the function W (X) for the different intervals for xU .
As an example, the results for the lowest range, 0 ≤ xU ≤
8
3 , are shown in Table B.1. The probability
in each row is derived from the probabilities of ex post payoffs of the spectator and recipient U . For
example, the probability in the first row is 1/8 because the spectator receives 4 with probability 1/4 and
recipient U receives 1.5xU with probability 1/2.
In a similar way, values of W (X), V (X) and the derivatives dV (X)
dxU
are computed for all other possible
intervals for xU . The derivatives are summarized in Table B.2. From the table it is clear that V (X) is
Table B.2: 2-Risk – Derivatives dV (X)
dxU
for all intervals for xU
Interval dV (X)
dxU
0 ≤ xU ≤
8
3 (α+ β)
8
3 ≤ xU ≤ 4
1
16(α+ β)(3δ + 13)
4 ≤ xU ≤ 6
1
8(α+ β)(5δ + 3)
6 ≤ xU ≤
20
3
1
8(α+ β)(7δ + 1)
20
3 ≤ xU ≤ 8
1
16(α+ β)(17δ − 1)
8 ≤ xU ≤ 10 −
1
6(α+ β)(11δ + 5)
10 ≤ xU ≤ 12 −
1
16(α+ β)(7δ + 9)
12 ≤ xU ≤ 16 −
1
8(α+ β)(δ + 7)
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Table B.3: 3-Risk – W (x), V (X) and dV (X)
dxU
for 4 ≤ xU ≤
24
5
Probability W (X)
1
4 ×
4
5 =
1
5 4− α(1.25xU − 4)− α(12 − xU )
1
4 ×
4
5 =
1
5 6− β(6 − 1.25xU )− α(10 − xU )
1
4 ×
4
5 =
1
5 10− β(10 − 1.25xU )− α(6− xU )
1
4 ×
4
5 =
1
5 12− β(12 − 1.25xU )− β(xU − 4)
1
4 ×
1
5 =
1
20 4− 4β − α(12 − xU )
1
4 ×
1
5 =
1
20 6− 6β − α(10 − xU )
1
4 ×
1
5 =
1
20 10− 10β − α(6− xU )
1
4 ×
1
5 =
1
20 12 − 12β − β(xU − 4)
Ep(W (X)) 8− (α+ β)(
31
5 −
1
2xU )
W (Ep(X)) 8− (α+ β)(8− xU )
V (X) 8− (α+ β)[(1 − δ)(315 −
1
2xU ) + δ(8 − xU )]
dV (X)
dxU
1
2 (α+ β)(δ + 1)
strictly increasing in xU for xU ≤ 20/3 and strictly decreasing in xU for xU ≥ 8. For 20/3 ≤ xU ≤ 8
it holds that the first derivative is zero if δ = 1/17. In that case any xU in this interval constitutes an
optimal allocation. In contrast, if δ < 1/17 the optimal allocation is 20/3 and it is 8 if δ > 1/17.
3-Risk. This problem is characterized by p = 0.8, kH = 1.25, and kl = 0. Using the values of kH
and kl together with the distribution of xS gives thus 16/5, 4, 24/5, 6, 8, 48/5, 10, and 12 as equality
benchmarks. From these benchmarks, we can again derive the function W (X) in different intervals for
xU .
As an example, Table B.3 shows the results for the interval 4 ≤ xU ≤
24
5 . The probability in each row
is derived from the probabilities of the ex post payoffs of the spectator and recipient U . For example, the
probability in the first row is 1/5 because the spectator receives 4 with probability 1/4 and recipient U
receives 1.25xU with probability 4/5.
Similarly, we obtain values of W (X), V (X) and the derivatives dV (X)
dxU
for all intervals of xU . The
derivatives are summarized in Table B.4. It is easily seen from the table, that if δ > 0, V (X) is strictly
Table B.4: 3-Risk – Derivatives dV (X)
dxU
for all intervals for xU
Interval dV (X)
dxU
0 ≤ xU ≤
16
5 (α+ β)
16
5 ≤ xU ≤ 4
1
4(α+ β)(δ + 3)
4 ≤ xU ≤
24
5
1
2(α+ β)(δ + 1)
24
5 ≤ xU ≤ 6
1
4(α+ β)(3δ + 1)
6 ≤ xU ≤ 8 (α+ β)δ
8 ≤ xU ≤
48
5 −
1
4(α+ β)(3δ + 1)
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5 ≤ xU ≤ 10 −
1
2(α+ β)(δ + 1)
10 ≤ xU ≤ 12 −
1
4(α+ β)(δ + 3)
12 ≤ xU ≤ 16 −(α+ β)
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Table B.5: 4-Risk – W (x), V (X) and dV (X)
dxU
for 5 ≤ xU ≤ 6
Probability W (X)
1
4 ×
1
2 =
1
8 4− α(2xU − 4)− α(12 − xU )
1
4 ×
1
2 =
1
8 6− α(2xU − 6)− α(10 − xU )
1
4 ×
1
2 =
1
8 10− α(2xU − 10) − α(6− xU )
1
4 ×
1
2 =
1
8 12− β(12 − 2xU )− β(xU − 4)
1
4 ×
1
2 =
1
8 4− 4β − α(12 − xU )
1
4 ×
1
2 =
1
8 6− 6β − α(10 − xU )
1
4 ×
1
2 =
1
8 10− 10β − α(6− xU )
1
4 ×
1
2 =
1
8 12 − 12β − β(xU − 4)
Ep(W (X)) 8−
9
2(α+ β)
W (Ep(X)) 8− (α+ β)(8− xU )
V (X) 8− (α+ β)[92 (1− δ) + δ(8 − xU )]
dV (X)
dxU
(α+ β)δ
increasing in xU for xU ≤ 8 and strictly decreasing in xU when xU ≥ 8. Hence, the optimal allocation in
this case is 8. In contrast, if δ = 0 the first derivative is strictly positive (negative) for xU < 6 (xU > 8)
and zero for 6 ≤ xU ≤ 8. Therefore, any value in the latter interval constitutes an optimal allocation.
4-Risk. This problem is characterized by p = 0.5, kH = 2, and kl = 0 and the equality benchmarks
are given by 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, and 12. As in the former problems, using these benchmarks we can derive
the function W (X) for the different intervals for xU .
As an example, Table B.5 shows the results for the interval 5 ≤ xU ≤ 6. The probability in each row
is derived from the probabilities of the ex post payoffs of the spectator and recipient U . For example, the
probability in the first row is 1/8 because the spectator receives 4 with probability 1/4 and recipient U
receives 2xU with probability 1/2.
Similarly, we obtain values of W (X), V (X) and the derivatives dV (X)
dxU
for all intervals of xU . The
derivatives are summarized in Table B.6. Using the results from the table it is easily shown that if δ = 0,
the optimal allocation to recipient U is any value in the interval [5, 6]. If 0 < δ < 1/3, the optimal value
Table B.6: 4-Risk – Derivatives dV (X)
dxU
for all intervals for xU
Interval dV (X)
dxU
0 ≤ xU ≤ 2 (α+ β)
2 ≤ xU ≤ 3
1
4(α+ β)(δ + 3)
3 ≤ xU ≤ 4
1
2(α+ β)(δ + 1)
4 ≤ xU ≤ 5
1
4(α+ β)(3δ + 1)
5 ≤ xU ≤ 6 (α+ β)δ
6 ≤ xU ≤ 8
1
2(α+ β)(3δ − 1)
8 ≤ xU ≤ 10 −
1
2(α+ β)(δ + 1)
10 ≤ xU ≤ 12 −
1
4(α+ β)(δ + 3)
12 ≤ xU ≤ 16 −(α+ β)
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Table B.7: 5-Risk – W (x), V (X) and dV (X)
dxU
for 6 ≤ xU ≤ 8
Probability U(X)
1
4 ×
1
5 =
1
20 4− α(5xU − 4)− α(12 − xU )
1
4 ×
1
5 =
1
20 6− α(5xU − 6)− α(10 − xU )
1
4 ×
1
5 =
1
20 10− α(5xU − 10)− β(xU − 6)
1
4 ×
1
5 =
1
20 12− α(5xU − 12)− β(xU − 4)
1
4 ×
4
5 =
1
5 4− 4β − α(12 − xU )
1
4 ×
4
5 =
1
5 6− 6β − α(10 − xU )
1
4 ×
4
5 =
1
5 10 − 10β − β(xU − 6)
1
4 ×
4
5 =
1
5 12 − 12β − β(xU − 4)
Ep(U(X)) 8− (α+ β)(
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10 +
1
2xU )
U(Ep(X)) 8− (α+ β)(8− xU )
V (X) 8− (α+ β)[(1 − δ)(3910 +
1
2xU ) + δ(8 − xU )]
dV (X)
dxU
(α + β)(32δ −
1
2 )
is 6. If δ = 1/3, any value in the interval [6, 8] is optimal. Finally, with δ > 1/3, the optimal amount
given to recipient U is 8.
5-Risk. This problem is characterized by p = 0.2, kH = 5, kl = 0 and the equality benchmarks are
given by 4/5, 6/5, 2, 12/5, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12. As in the former problems, using these benchmarks we can
derive the function W (X) for the different intervals for xU .
As an example, Table B.7 shows the results for the interval 6 ≤ xU ≤ 8. The probability in each row
is derived from the probabilities of the ex post payoffs of the spectator and recipient U . For example, the
probability in the first row is 1/20 because the spectator receives 4 with probability 1/4 and recipient U
receives 5xU with probability 1/5.
Similarly, we obtain values of W (X), V (X) and the derivatives dV (X)
dxU
for all intervals of xU . The
derivatives are summarized in Table B.8. From the table the optimal allocations are easily obtained. If
δ = 0 any value in the interval 125 ≤ xU ≤ 4 is optimal, if δ = 1/5 any value in the interval 4 ≤ xU ≤ 6
Table B.8: 5-Risk – Derivatives dV (X)
dxU
for all intervals for xU
Interval dV (X)
dxU
0 ≤ xU ≤
4
5 (α+ β)
4
5 ≤ xU ≤
6
5
1
4(α+ β)(δ + 3)
6
5 ≤ xU ≤ 2
1
2(α+ β)(δ + 1)
2 ≤ xU ≤
12
5
1
4(α+ β)(3δ + 1)
12
5 ≤ xU ≤ 4 (α+ β)δ
4 ≤ xU ≤ 6
1
4(α+ β)(5δ − 1)
6 ≤ xU ≤ 8
1
2(α+ β)(3δ − 1)
8 ≤ xU ≤ 10 −
1
2(α+ β)(δ + 1)
10 ≤ xU ≤ 12 −
1
4(α+ β)(δ + 3)
12 ≤ xU ≤ 16 −(α+ β)
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is optimal, and if δ = 1/3 any value in the interval 6 ≤ xU ≤ 8 is optimal. Moreover, if 0 < δ < 1/5
allocation 4 is optimal, if 1/5 < δ < 1/3 allocation 6 is optimal, and finally if 1/3 < δ < 1 allocation 8 is
optimal.
(2) The statement follows straightforwardly from setting α = β = 0 in Equation B.1 and Tables B.2, B.4,
B.6, and B.8, respectively.

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C Goodness of fit of estimated justice types
Table C.1 shows regression results where observed allocations are regressed on predicted allocations using
the classification method discussed in the main text with all four justice views and assuming spectators
believed risk preferences of recipients.
Table C.1: Goodness of fit (using all four justice views)
Dep. var.: Observed allocation to U
Predicted allocation 0.952∗∗∗ (0.094)
Constant 0.750 (0.646)
N 112
R2 0.528
F(1,27) 101.69
Constant = 0 F(1,27) = 1.35 p = 0.2563
Predicted allocation = 1 F(1,27) = 0.26 p = 0.6149
Note: ∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1 percent level; OLS regres-
sion; standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedas-
ticity and are clustered on the 28 subjects.
Tables C.2–C.5 shows regression results where observed allocations are regressed on predicted alloca-
tions using the classification method discussed in the main text with only three justice views and assuming
spectators believed risk preferences of recipients.
Table C.2: Goodness of fit (‘utilitarian’ view dropped)
Dep. var.: Observed allocation to U
Predicted allocation 0.901∗∗∗ (0.084)
Constant 1.197∗∗ (0.556)
N 112
R2 0.466
F(1,27) 115.82
Constant = 0 F(1,27) = 4.64 p = 0.0402
Predicted allocation = 1 F(1,27) = 1.40 p = 0.2466
Note: ∗∗∗(∗∗) indicates significance at the 1 (5) percent level;
OLS regression; standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to
heteroskedasticity and are clustered on the 28 subjects.
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Table C.3: Goodness of fit (‘EV-equality’ view dropped)
Dep. var.: Observed allocation to U
Predicted allocation 0.745∗∗∗ (0.115)
Constant 2.465∗∗∗ (0.766)
N 112
R2 0.424
F(1,27) 41.86
Constant = 0 F(1,27) = 10.37 p = 0.0033
Predicted allocation = 1 F(1,27) = 4.93 p = 0.0350
Note: ∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1 percent level; OLS regres-
sion; standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedas-
ticity and are clustered on the 28 subjects.
Table C.4: Goodness of fit (‘ex post equality’ view dropped)
Dep. var.: Observed allocation to U
Predicted allocation 0.943∗∗∗ (0.097)
Constant 0.699 (0.678)
N 112
R2 0.496
F(1,27) 94.89
Constant = 0 F(1,27) = 1.06 p = 0.3112
Predicted allocation = 1 F(1,27) = 0.35 p = 0.5605
Note: ∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1 percent level; OLS regres-
sion; standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedas-
ticity and are clustered on the 28 subjects.
Table C.5: Goodness of fit (‘EU-equality’ view dropped)
Dep. var.: Observed allocation to U
Predicted allocation 0.981∗∗∗ (0.102)
Constant 0.595 (0.684)
N 112
R2 0.514
F(1,27) 92.76
Constant = 0 F(1,27) = 0.76 p = 0.3918
Predicted allocation = 1 F(1,27) = 0.04 p = 0.8518
Note: ∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1 percent level; OLS regres-
sion; standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedas-
ticity and are clustered on the 28 subjects.
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Table C.6 shows regression results where observed allocations are regressed on predicted allocations
using the classification method discussed in the main text, assuming spectators own risk preferences.
Table C.6: Goodness of fit (using all four justice views
and spectators’ own risk preferences)
Dep. var.: Observed allocation to U
Predicted allocation 0.923∗∗∗ (0.100)
Constant 0.859 (0.696)
N 112
R2 0.503
F(1,27) 84.788
Constant = 0 F(1,27) = 1.52 p = 0.23
Predicted allocation = 1 F(1,27) = 0.60 p = 0.45
Note: ∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1 percent level; OLS re-
gression; standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
are clustered on the 28 subjects.
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D Answers to Debriefing Questionnaire
In the following we provide some examples of answers provided by spectators in the debriefing ques-
tionnaire, where they were asked to shortly explain their allocation decisions. Answers are grouped into
categories that correspond to the theoretically identified justice views.
Examples of answers related to EV-equality:
“I wanted to give B and C what they earned in their assignment, so 8 per person. 50% chance
of 16 Euro and 50% chance of 0 Euro will also lead to a average earning of 8 (when repeating
it very often)”
“Both scored the same amount of money. I did not want to punish C for being selected as
C”
“I always allocated 8 because I thought this was most fair for C who always got the amount
allocated. C earned 8 so I thought it was good to always grant him that amount. B had
some random events that also influenced his earnings but since I could not influence those, I
didn’t take it into account”
Examples of answers related to EU-equality:
“tried to give B a bit more as he has the risk.”
“compensate B with a higher amount to compensate the risk of him getting 0”
“Since B takes a higher risk, he/she deserves a higher payout to remedy the risk he/she takes”
Examples of answers related to ex post equality:
“Since it would be either 5 times the amount or nothing I wanted to let the amount that B
could earn be equal that of C. So I gave 3 points to B (so that this person could earn 15
Euro) and the remaining 13 to C. This way the least amount of points was ‘wasted’ and could
lead to an equal distribution.”
“in case B is rewarded with money, the amount will be multiplied by 5. I chose this distri-
bution in order for everyone to have almost the same outcome”
“My aim was that if B wins, B won’t earn much more than C.”
Examples of answers related to utilitarianism:
“Since B has greater possibilities to get 0. I allocate more to C.”
“The chance was low for B to win, therefore more money to C.”
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E Experimental Instructions
General
In this experiment you can earn money with the decisions you make. Your earnings may also depend on
chance events and the decisions of other participants. At the end of the experiment you will be paid out in
cash individually and confidentially. In order to ensure the highest level of anonymity and confidentiality,
the payment will be carried out by a person that is not involved in this research project. The experimenters
cannot link your earnings and decisions to your identity in any way. During the experiment you are not
allowed to communicate in any other way than described in the instructions. If you have any questions
please raise your hand. An experimenter will then come to you and answer your questions in private. The
experiment consists of three parts. You will receive the instructions of a part only after the previous part
has ended.
Part 1
In the first part of the experiment you will be randomly matched into groups of three participants, which
will be labeled with the letters A, B and C. In this part of the experiment the B and C members of
a group are asked to independently perform a task that involves correctly positioning sliders on a bar.
Below you can see the representation of a slider in the initial position a) and in the correct position b),
which is always in the middle of the bar. The slider is positioned correctly if the number that shows up
to the right of the slider equals 50.
(a) Initial slider position
(b) Correct slider position
Figure E.1: Examples of slider positions
F or each correctly positioned slider 0.25 Euro are credited. There are a total of 32 sliders to be
positioned in 6 minutes time, so that B and C can be credited up to 8 Euro each. After the 6 minutes
are over, the credit accumulated by B and C, who are in the same group, is deposited in a joint group
account. Each member of a group (A, B and C) is then informed about the total amount in the joint
account of their group. A also receives information about how many sliders were correctly positioned by
B and C members in her or his group.
The task of A and earnings determination for A, B, and C: Person A earns money for
performing a task, which is described below. At the end of the experiment, the earnings of A will be
publicly and randomly determined by drawing a card from a stack of numbered cards. The earnings of
A can be 4.-, 6.-, 10.- or 12.- Euro and each of these earnings are equally likely. Notice that the earnings
of A only depend on chance. In particular, the earnings of A do in no way depend on the decisions taken
by A. Also notice that the earnings of A are not taken from the joint account.
The task of A is to divide the amount of money in the joint account between B and C. A is asked to
make a division in 7 different decision situations. At the end of the experiment one out of the 7 decisions
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will be randomly selected to determine B and C earnings. Each decision situation is independent and
equally likely to be the one that determines the earnings of B and C. Therefore, person A should carefully
consider each decision and make each decision in isolation.
The 7 decision situations differ in the way the amount of money assigned to B and C translates into
earnings for B and C. The table below summarizes the 7 decision situations and shows how the earnings
of B and C are determined in each decision situation. Notice that during the experiment the 7 decision
situations will appear in random order. Please have a look at it.
Decision Earnings of B Earnings of C
1 allocation to B allocation to C
2 20% chance 5 times allocation to B, 80% times 0 allocation to C
3 50% chance 2 times allocation to B, 50% times 0 allocation to C
4 80% chance 1.25 times allocation to B, 20% times 0 allocation to C
5 50% chance 1.5 times allocation to B, 50% times 0.5 times allocation to B allocation to C
6 unknown chance 2 times allocation to B, unknown chance 0 allocation to C
7 unknown chance 1.5 times allocation to B, unknown chance 0.5 times allocation to B allocation to C
We will now explain each decision situation in detail.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 1 is selected to matter for payment then the
earnings of B are equal to the allocation to B and the earnings of C are equal to the allocation to C.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 2 is selected to matter for payment the final earnings
of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated to B and on a chance event. The chance event will be the
public drawing of a card from a stack of 100 cards numbered from 1 to 100. If a card with a number from
1 to 20 will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 5 times the money allocated to B (i.e., 500% of the
allocation to B). If a number from 21 to 100 will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. In other
words, with 20% chance the earnings of B will be 5 times the allocation to B and with 80% chance the
earnings of B will be 0 Euro. The earnings of C are equal to the allocation to C.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 3 is selected to matter for payment the final
earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated to B and on a chance event. The chance event will
the public drawing of a card from a stack of 100 cards numbered from 1 to 100. If a card with a number
from 1 to 50 will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 2 times the allocation to B (i.e. 200% of the
allocation to B). If a number from 51 to 100 will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. In other
words, with 50% chance the earnings of B will be 2 times the allocation to B and with 50% chance the
earnings of B will be 0 Euro. The earnings of C are equal to the allocation to C.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 4 is selected to matter for payment the final
earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated to B and on a chance event. The chance event will
the public drawing of a card from a stack of 100 cards numbered from 1 to 100. If a card with a number
from 1 to 80 will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 1.25 times the allocation to B (i.e. 125% of the
allocation to B). If a number from 81 to 100 will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. In other
words, with 80% chance the earnings of B will be 1.25 times the allocation to B and with 20% chance the
earnings of B will be 0 Euro. The earnings of C are equal to the allocation to C.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 5 is selected to matter for payment the final
earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated to B and on a chance event. The chance event will
the public drawing of a card from a stack of 100 cards numbered from 1 to 100. If a card with a number
from 1 to 50 will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 1.5 times the allocation to B (i.e. 150% of the
allocation to B). If a number from 51 to 100 will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 0.5 times the
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allocation to B (i.e. 50% of the allocation to B). In other words, with 50% chance the earnings of B will
be 1.5 times the allocation to B and with 50% chance the earnings of B will be 0.5 times the allocation
to B. The earnings of C are equal to the allocation to C.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 6 is selected to matter for payment the final earnings
of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated to B and on a chance event. The experimenters will first
randomly select black or red to be the winning color. The chance event will then be the public drawing
of a card from a stack of 100 cards which are black or red. The total number of red and black cards sums
up to 100, but neither A nor B nor C nor the experimenters know how many red cards and how many
black cards are in the stack. If a card with the winning color is drawn the earnings of B will be 2 times
the allocation to B (i.e. 200% of the allocation to B). If a card with the losing color is drawn then the
earnings of B will be 0 Euro. In other words, with an unknown chance the earnings of B will be 2 times
the allocation to B and with an unknown chance the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. The earnings of C are
equal to the allocation to C.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 7 is selected to matter for payment the final earnings
of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated to B and on a chance event. The experimenters will first
randomly select black or red to be the winning color. The chance event will then be the public drawing
of a card from a stack of 100 cards which are black or red. The total number of red and black cards sums
up to 100, but neither A nor B nor C nor the experimenters know how many red cards and how many
black cards are in the stack. If a card with the winning color is drawn the earnings of B will be 1.5 times
the allocation to B (i.e. 150% of the allocation to B). If a card with the losing color is drawn then the
earnings of B will be 0.5 times the allocation to B (i.e. 50% of the allocation to B). In other words, with
an unknown chance the earnings of B will be 1.5 times the allocation to B and with an unknown chance
the earnings of B will be 0.5 times the allocation to B. The earnings of C are equal to the allocation to C.
If you have any question please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to answer your question
in private. In the following you are asked a few questions that will help us assessing your understanding
of the decision situations described above. Please fill in the missing figures. Note, that in these questions
we are not interested in the actual numbers you fill in but only if you fill them in correctly. During the
experiment you will have the possibility to use a calculator by clicking on the icon in the bottom right
corner of the screen. When you are ready please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you
to check your answers. Once you are ready please wait quietly.
Consider decision situation 3 and assume that the total in the joint account is 16 Euro. If A assigns
. . . Euro to C and . . . Euro to B, then this means that with. . .% chance B earns . . . Euro and with . . .%
chance . . . Euro. C earns . . . Euro.
Consider decision situation 5 and assume that the total in the joint account is 15 Euro. If A assigns
. . . Euro to C and . . . Euro to B, then this means that with . . .% chance B earns . . . Euro and with . . .%
chance . . . Euro. C earns . . . Euro.
Consider decision situation 7 and assume that the total in the joint account is 12 Euro. If A assigns
. . . Euro to C and . . . Euro to B, then this means that with . . .% chance B earns . . . Euro and with
. . .%chance . . . Euro. C earns . . . Euro.
Part 2
You are now going to make a series of decisions. These decisions will not influence your earnings from the
first part of the experiment, nor will the decisions you made in the first part of the experiment influence
the earnings from this part. Furthermore, the decisions you are going to make will only influence your
own earnings.
You will be confronted with 12 decision situations. All these decision situations are completely independent
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of each other. A choice you made in one decision situation does not affect any of the other following decision
situations.
Each decision situation is displayed on a screen. The screen consists of 20 rows. You have to decide for
every row whether you prefer option A or option B. Option A is the same for every row in a given decision
situation, while option B takes 20 different values, one for each row. Note that within a decision situation
you can only switch once from option B to option A: if you switch more than once a warning message will
appear on the screen and you will be asked to change your decisions. By clicking on NEXT you will see
some examples screens of decision situations.
This is a screen-shot of a typical decision situation that you are going to face. You are not asked to make
choices now! Please have a careful look. Thereafter click on NEXT to proceed.
This is another screen-shot of a typical decision situation that you are going to face. If you want to
review the previous example click on BACK, otherwise click on NEXT to proceed.
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Determination of earnings. At the end of the experiment one of the 12 decision situations will be
randomly selected with equal probability. Once the decision situation is selected, one of the 20 rows in
this decision situation will be randomly selected with equal probability. The choice you have made in this
specific row will determine your earnings.
Consider, for instance, the first screen-shot that you have seen. Option A gives you a 25% chance to
earn 16.- Euro and a 75% chance to earn 4.- Euro. Option B is always a sure amount that ranges from
16.- Euro in the first row, to 4.60 Euro in the 20th row. Suppose that the 12th row is randomly selected.
If you would have selected option B, you would receive 9.40 Euro. If, instead, you would have selected
option A, the outcome of the lottery determines your earnings. At the end of the experiment the lottery
outcome will be publicly determined by randomly drawing a card from a stack of numbered cards.
Consider now the second screen-shot that you have seen. Option A gives you an unknown chance to
earn 12.- Euro and an unknown chance to earn 4.- Euro. Option B is always a lottery that gives you
different chances to earn 12.- Euro or 4.- Euro. Suppose that the 10th row is randomly selected. If you
would have selected option B, you would receive 12.- Euro with 55% chance and 4.- Euro with 45% chance.
If, instead, you would have selected option A, a stack of red and black cards would be used at the end of
the experiment to determine whether you earn 12.- Euro or 4.- Euro. This stack of cards will be the same
that has been described in part 1: recall that the exact number of black cards and the exact number of
red cards in the stack are unknown to you and to us as well. You would earn 12.- Euro if a card of the
winning color is drawn and 4.- Euro otherwise.
Please note that each decision situation has the same likelihood to be the one that is relevant for your
earnings. Therefore, you should view each decision independently and consider all your choices carefully.
If you like to, you can review the examples screens once more by clicking on BACK. If you have any
questions please raise your hand. When you are ready, please press the BEGIN button below.
Part 3
In the following you are asked to estimate the choices made by one of your group members in 6 decision
situations of the second part of the experiment. After having made these estimates you will answer a
questionnaire and then the experiment will be over.
You are going to be randomly matched to one of your group members. For a certain decision situation
you are asked to indicate which is the last row where you believe your matched group member chooses
option B before switching to option A. You earn 1 Euro if you correctly indicate the switching point of
your matched group member in a certain decision situation. Therefore, you can earn up to 6 Euro in
total. If the true switching point of your matched group member is different from the point you indicated
you earn nothing.
If you do not want to indicate a single switching point you can indicate a range of values where you think
the switching point of your matched group member lies. If the true switching point lies in this range of
values you will earn a positive amount smaller than 1 Euro. The exact amount you earn is calculated
according to a formula. The formula captures the idea that earnings are inversely related to the length of
the interval you indicate. This means that the larger the interval you indicate the smaller your potential
earnings are. This formula also guarantees that your earnings are maximized if you truthfully indicate
your estimate. If the true switching point of your counterpart lies outside the interval you indicate you
earn nothing. Please click on NEXT to view an example.
This is a screen-shot of a typical screen that you are going to see.
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Assume, for instance, that you believe that your matched group member chooses option B for the last
time when option B is equal to 6.- Euro. In such a case, you would type the number 6 in both boxes at
the bottom of the screen.
Assume now that you believe that your matched group member may switch from option B to option
A when option B takes any value between 8.- Euro and 4.50 Euro. In such a case, you would type the
number 8 in the first box and the number 4.50 in the second box. Notice that you earn nothing if you
type in two values that cover all possible switching points, in this case if you type in 10 and 0.50.
If you have any question please raise your hand. Otherwise click on NEXT to proceed.
This is another screen-shot of a typical screen that you are going to face.
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Assume, for instance, that you believe that your matched group member chooses option B for the last
time when option B gives a chance of 40% to win 12.- Euro. In such a case, you would type the number
40 in both boxes at the bottom of the screen.
Assume now that you believe that your matched group member switches from option B to option A when
the winning chance of option B is between 70% and 25%. In such a case, you would type the number 70
in the first box and the number 25 in the second box. Notice that you earn nothing if you type in two
values that cover all possible switching points, that is if you type in 100 and 5.
If you have any question please raise your hand. If you want to review the previous examples once more
click on BACK. Otherwise, click on BEGIN to start the third part of the experiment.
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F Allocation Problems Characterized by Ambiguity
The experiment also included two allocation problems characterized by ambiguity, shown in Table F.1,
where the unknown probability is indicated by p.
Table F.1: Allocation problems under Ambiguity
allocation problem final earnings of U final earnings of C
6-Ambiguity (p : xU × 1.5, xU × 0.5) xC
7-Ambiguity (p : xU × 2, xU × 0) xC
In order to implement ambiguity in the laboratory a stack of 100 cards colored black and red is used.
Neither the participants nor the experimenter know the exact color composition of the stack, and each
participant is free to choose his/her winning color at the beginning of the experiment.
Table F.2 shows descriptive statistics and statistical test on spectators’ allocations in the presence of
ambiguity. An interesting aspect of the allocations in 6-Ambiguity and 7-Ambiguity is that they do not
Table F.2: Allocations in ambiguous allocation problems
allocation to U
allocation problem mean median st. dev. WSR test K-S test
6-Ambiguity 8.36 8 1.75 z=0.99 p=0.03
(p=0.32)
7-Ambiguity 7.73 8 2.39 z=-1.24 p=0.03
(p=0.21)
Note: WSR ... Wilcoxon signed-rank, K-S ... Kolmogorov-Smirnov; the nul
hypothesis for both tests is that the true distribution is that all spectators
allocate 8 to recipient U .
differ from allocations in 2-Risk and 4-Risk, respectively (WSR tests). Given that these pairs of prospects
are characterized by the same potential outcomes, this result suggests that spectators treat ambiguity no
differently than a 50-50 prospect.
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G Risk Preference and Ambiguity Attitudes Elicitation Tasks
Table G.1 shows the lotteries used in the risk preferences elicitation task described in Section 3 (Part 3)
of the main text.
In addition to risk preferences we also elicited subjects’ ambiguity attitudes. To this end, subjects
faced six decision screens where they made choices between an ambiguous lottery and several risky ones.
Both the ambiguous and the risky lotteries in a given decision screen were characterized by the same
outcome pair, which are those in Table G.1.
Table G.1: Lotteries
Lottery p1 x1 x2
1 0.20 40 0
2 0.50 16 0
3 0.80 10 0
4 0.50 12 4
5 0.25 16 4
6 0.33 12 0
Note: lotteries used in risk
preferences and ambiguity
attitudes elicitation tasks; p1
denotes the probability of
winning ACx1.
As in the first part of the experiment, ambiguity was generated with a deck of red and black cards in
unknown color composition. On each screen subjects saw a description of the ambiguous lottery and a list
of 20 risky lotteries. The first and the last risky lottery on the list were both degenerate and guarantee,
respectively, the high and the low outcome of the lottery. From row to row in the list the likelihood of the
high outcome decreased by 5%, while the likelihood of the low outcome increased by 5%. In each decision
screen, subjects could switch only once from the risky to the ambiguous lottery.
Assuming subjective expected utility theory (Savage 1954), a subject’s switching point reveals the
bounds of the probability interval containing her prior belief on the ambiguous event. We take the
midpoint of the interval to be the prior belief. (As the length of the interval is always equal to 0.05 taking
the midpoint cannot result in a large bias.) Since the ambiguous event is the same on all decision screens,
subjects should consistently reveal the same prior belief in all decisions. Pair-wise comparisons of elicited
prior beliefs show that subjects indeed hold largely consistent beliefs (p ≥ 0.22 Wilcoxon signed-rank
test). Thus, for each subject we can construct a variable called “prior-belief” defined as the average of
the prior beliefs elicited from the six decision screens. The mean prior-belief of spectators is equal to 0.46
(st.dev. = 0.08, median prior belief = 0.48), which indicates only a slight aversion to ambiguity. Notably
the standard deviation of prior-belief is very small, indicating very similar prior beliefs among spectators.
Pair-wise comparisons of spectator’s, R’s and C’s prior beliefs reveal no statistically significant difference
between them (p ≥ 0.69, Mann-Whitney tests).
We also investigate subjects’ beliefs about others’ ambiguity preferences by asking subjects to estimate
the choices made by a randomly matched group member for two ambiguous decision screens. The belief
elicitation is incentivized with the interval scoring rule (Schlag and van der Weele 2015). We use the
average of the two elicited believed prior beliefs to get a measure of spectators’ belief about others’
ambiguity attitudes, where ambiguity is disliked more the smaller the prior belief on the ambiguous
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event. We find that spectators’ beliefs about others’ ambiguity attitudes are highly, though imperfectly,
correlated with their own attitudes toward ambiguity (Spearman’s ρ = 0.50, p = 0.009, Pearson correlation
coefficient = 0.61). Two outliers believing that others’ priors on the ambiguous event were below 0.12,
and thus unreasonably extreme, are excluded when conducting these tests.
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